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ABSTRACT
The composition of the two major parties, both at the mass and elite level, has
changed dramatically over the past fifty years. In this period we have witnessed
a notable resurgence of ideological separation between the parties. Yet we do not
understand well the effects of polarization on other political processes. Does polariza-
tion affect the process of creating legislation (that is, lawmaking)? Does polarization
affect the extent to which policy is reflective of public preferences (that is, represen-
tation)? Does polarization change the way individuals perceive the Congress and its
processes (that is, approval)?
The dissertation seeks to answer these three questions. To do so, it leverages a
theory with a rich intellectual history: Conditional Party Government (CPG). Most
basically, CPG assumes that lawmaking strategies and policy outputs should vary
systematically with the shape of majority preferences (relative to minority prefer-
ences) and the amount of ideological separation between the two. In its current
form, however, CPG is not sufficiently developed to make systematic predictions
about the nature of lawmaking across all arrangements of majority and minority
parties. Moreover, no test of CPG has used quality measures of key concepts over
time in a systematic, longitudinal test of the theory. Accordingly, I formalize the pre-
dictions of CPG for three key outcomes—majority power, minority power, and policy
results—for each of the possible combinations of political parties (heterogenous and
homogenous, ideologically similar and dissimilar).
The contribution of the dissertation is fourfold. First, it provides a systematizing
of CPG. That is, it generates unique predictions for each of the possibly observable
conditions of parties. Second, it fills a large gap in the literature by providing the
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first systematic, longitudinal tests of CPG and, thus, the effects of polarization on
lawmaking. By quantifying the “conditions” of CPG, we can identify the importance
of each of the components of the theory—majority and minority party shape and
the distance between the two—in determining the expected patterns of partisan
lawmaking strategies and policy outputs.
Third, it generates a novel measure of restrictive legislative rules over time. Rules
are notoriously hard to measure, and no quality, longitudinal measures of the restric-
tiveness of rules exist. Accordingly, I code all recorded votes in the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac from 1947 to 2012 (over 27,000), isolate all votes on any motion
pertaining to legislative rules (over 3,000), collect those rules and content-analyze
them, using Python, to determine if they fit patterns of restrictiveness (barring
amendments, limiting time for debate, and so on). This strategy can be extended
to code virtually any desired attribute of rules over time. This is one of the most
comprehensive datasets on legislative rules in the discipline. In particular, I employ
these data in the dissertation to test the theory I develop regarding the implications
of polarization on lawmaking.
Fourth, the dissertation uses CPG to test the implications of polarization for
representation and for approval. These novel analyses help to advance the discipline
beyond investigating the causes of polarization and toward examining its effects on
the American political system.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION
The composition of the two major political parties, both at the mass and elite
level, has changed dramatically over the past fifty years. Whereas scholars once
noted the lack of ideological differentiation between the parties (Brady, Cooper, and
Hurley 1979), even lamenting this ideological overlap (APSA 1950), the last thirty
years have witnessed a notable resurgence of ideological separation between the two
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008; Abramowitz 2010). Our understanding of this
process is imperfect, but it is clear that, especially at the elite level, Republicans and
Democrats have become increasingly different from one another. This ideological
separation is commonly called polarization. While polarization can take many forms
(Wood and Jordan 2011), in the most general sense it is the phenomenon of parties
becoming ideologically distinct.
As we build an understanding of the causes of polarization, however, we know rel-
atively less about its effects. The effects of polarization are potentially far reaching.
One set of effects of polarization is with regards to the construction of legislation,
heretofore referred to as lawmaking. Lawmaking itself is comprised of several indi-
vidual components. Legislation must be scheduled to reach the floor of a lawmaking
institution. Once there, rules govern both the length and openness of debate on the
legislation, as well as how open it is to amendment.
Lawmaking also has its own effects. Rules and procedures can be constructed in
such a way as to move the ideological tenor of legislation from non-median outcomes.
As a result, laws can shift in how representative they are of the average dispositions
of the public they are meant to serve. In other words, lawmaking can have a direct
effect on the quality of representation a public receives from a legislative institution.
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Lawmaking might also affect the public’s disposition toward an institution. Depend-
ing on how open or closed the lawmaking process is generally, or how combative the
parties are during that process, the public might change in how much it approves of
the institution.
At its core, this dissertation is about the puzzle of how polarization, lawmaking,
and the subsequent effects of lawmaking are linked. While scholars have danced
around the edges of this puzzle, we lack systematic predictions regarding exactly
how polarization affects lawmaking and both lawmaking and polarization affect rep-
resentation and approval. To generate these predictions, the dissertation leverages
a theory with a rich intellectual history: Conditional Party Government (CPG).1
Most basically, CPG assumes that lawmaking strategies and policy outputs should
vary systematically with the shape of aggregated majority party preferences in the
Congress (relative to minority preferences) and the amount of ideological separation
between the two. In its current form, however, CPG is not sufficiently developed to
make systematic predictions about the nature of lawmaking across all arrangements
of majority and minority parties.
What is in order, then, is a full explication of CPG and its strengths and its
shortcomings as a systematic theory of lawmaking. Grasping exactly what the theory
does (and does not) predict is critical to understanding polarization and lawmaking.
With this understanding in hand, we can begin to envision a comprehensive theory
1Congress is a much studied institution. As such, any new theory of lawmaking must ground
itself in the extant literature. I adopt CPG theory in my research because my reading of the compet-
ing theories of lawmaking in Congress—which includes those advanced by Chiou and Rothenberg
(2011), Cox and McCubbins (2005), Krehbiel (1998), and Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007)—
suggests that CPG is the dominant research paradigm on this topic, in Kuhn’s (1962) sense of the
latter term. As further evidence for this point, a keyword search in the political science journal
articles archived in JSTOR in September 2104 for “conditional + party + government” produced
256 pages of citations or article-uses of that term. In contrast, a comparable search for “cartel +
theory” produced 60 pages of citations, and a search for “pivotal + politics + theory” returned 149
pages of citations.
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of lawmaking.
1.1 Existing Work on Polarization and Lawmaking
CPG traces back to the works of Rohde (1991) and Aldrich (1995).2 Aldrich
(1995) is concerned with the strategic reasons why politicians, such as legislators,
might accede to join a party as an organization. Through parties, ambitious politi-
cians access a network through which to obtain office, they get to claim credit from
common policy positions via a party label, and the party subsequently helps them
overcome the collective action problem once in government (284-285). This has been
referred to as the “electoral connection” of CPG.
Naturally, the success of the party in the electorate has implications for how it
operates in the legislature. Rohde (1991) summarizes the intertwined nature of elec-
tions, party, and leadership (162-163). Electoral victories produce different types
of party caucuses, akin to the effects of “external” factors characterized by Brady,
Cooper, and Hurley (1979). When majority-party caucuses are particularly homo-
geneous, especially relative to a heterogeneous minority party, party members are
expected to delegate considerable powers to the party leadership. These powers are
consensually expected to be used to achieve partisan legislative ends. The impor-
tance of party leadership in achieving partisan ends has been noted before (Cooper
and Brady 1981).
CPG, then, should be a formalization of these diffuse expectations. In the par-
ticular case of the United States Congress, the willingness of members of Congress
(MCs) to delegate authority and power to party leadership should vary predictably
over time. Specifically, it varies according to the “condition” of CPG: consistently
2As will be discussed, CPG can claim a voluminous literature. Not all of that literature is covered
here. Instead, I focus on those most important pieces which are most concerned with constructing
or verifying the core components of the theory.
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Table 1.1: CPG: Conditions and Expectations
Condition 1. Homogeneity of majority party (relative to minority)
2. Distance between parties
Expectations 1. Increased leadership powers
2. Expectation of the party to use those powers
3. Partisan legislation
defined as the degree of homogeneity within the majority party, relative to the minor-
ity party, and the amount of policy separation between the two (Aldrich, Rohde, and
Tofias 2004, 3; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 5; Aldrich and Rohde 2001, 5; Rohde and
Aldrich 2010, 236).3 Satisfaction of this condition should lead to three consequences:
increased leadership powers, an expectation of the party to use those powers, and
subsequent partisan legislation as a result of using those powers (Aldrich and Ro-
hde 1998, 5; Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias 2004, 3; Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias 2007,
103).4 These two critical components—the conditions and expectations of CPG—are
presented in Table 1.1.
A variety of evidence has been marshalled in support of the theory. Rohde (1991)
demonstrates how resurgent partisanship in the House was a cause of increased ho-
mogeneity, increased leadership, and leader orientations. Aldrich (2011) shows how,
as more extreme MCs arrive in the House,5 party voting and partisan legislation
increase, especially through the use of special rules in legislation. Aldrich and Ro-
hde (2000) show that satisfaction of the “condition” of CPG also leads to partisan
3Fortunately, this consistency offers two fairly well defined concepts that can be measured in a
straightforward way (with a review of potential measures as early as Brady, Cooper, and Hurley
1979).
4It is possible to imagine other theoretically implied outcomes, such as partisan organization of
committees (Aldrich and Battista 2002). But I focus on the three major outcomes, as consistently
defined by the original authors of the theory.
5The “electoral connection” of CPG is elaborated in Aldrich and Rohde (2001).
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advantages on committees, especially critical ones, as well as advantages in Speaker
powers and agenda setting. Rohde and Aldrich (2010) describe broadly the various
institutional changes within the House since the mid-twentieth century and relate
them to changes in the level of CPG.
The comprehensiveness of CPG (it accounts for the electoral connection between
constituencies and the members they send to Congress, it makes predictions about
the interplay between types of caucuses and the leadership powers they will afford
their party leadership, and it continues this connection all the way through to policy
outcomes) has spawned an industry of scholars documenting additional evidence
for the theory, at multiple levels and across multiple predictions. Among the more
important works, Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008), testing the mechanism of leadership
powers, demonstrate that the use of special rules in the House varies systematically
according to the institutional structure of the House (the construction of which is
influenced by CPG). Aldrich and Battista (2002) find that state-level CPG affects the
distribution of committee assignments within the state (regardless of the jurisdiction
of the committee). Clucas (2009) uses a survey of state-level legislators to assess
state-level CPG and demonstrates that states with high CPG adopted independent
“Contracts with America” in the 1994 election cycle. Testing other implications,
Taylor (2003) demonstrates that PAC contributions shift to party leadership from
standing committees as CPG rises.
Despite its strengths, CPG is currently limited in a number of ways. Most impor-
tantly, the theory itself is incomplete. It relates the conditions of CPG to expected
outcomes, but it fails to specify predictions for all possible observable “conditions.”
Evidence for the core components of the theory is usually drawn from case stud-
ies of partisan and leader influence on particular roll calls, rather than systematic
longitudinal tests. Even when empirical tests are specified, they are rarely truly
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longitudinal and instead investigate “eras” of institutional structure in the House.
These limitations—and the opportunities for future research they create—are ex-
plored more fully in the next section.
1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Limitations and Unsolved Puzzles
The most problematic omission of the current form of CPG is that its theoretical
predictions are incomplete.6 In a well documented criticism by Cox and McCubbins
(2005), CPG offers little theoretical insight on expectations when the condition of
CPG is not met. In fact, the foundation of Cox and McCubbins’ criticism is that
certain majority powers are unconditional. Specifically, the majority should never set
an agenda so as to pass a bill against the wishes of the majority of the majority party.
This expectation is regardless of the shapes of the distributions of the two parties or
the distance between them. Expanding on similar criticisms, Krehbiel (1998, 168)
goes so far as to imply that, in its current form, CPG is largely not testable against
other theories of lawmaking (particularly his theory of majoritarian pivotal politics).
In addition, CPG implicitly assumes that all of the conditions (majority homo-
geneity, minority heterogeneity, and ideological separation) will be satisfied simulta-
neously. Indeed, the preferred measure of CPG is constructed in Aldrich, Rohde, and
Tofias (2007) as a multiple-dimension principal components analysis of four separate
variables,7 calling the latent dimension the “condition.” Such an assumption might
be undesirable, especially given critiques like that of Cox and McCubbins (2005)
on the lack of theoretical expectations when various parts of the condition are not
satisfied.
These criticisms are depicted in Table 1.2. This typology generalizes the possible
6For a more detailed treatment of the following criticisms, see Smith (2007).
7Inter-party homogeneity, intra-party homogeneity, party separation (according to a discriminate
function analysis), and the R2 from the discriminate function, all using DW-NOMINATE scores.
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Table 1.2: CPG: Current Predictions According with Varying Degrees of the “Con-
dition”
Majority Party
Heterogenous Homogenous
Minority Party Heterogenous No Prediction CPG
Homogenous No Prediction “Some” CPG
“CPG” should be interpreted as the three outcomes predicted by the theory,
outlined in Table 1.1.
permutations of parties, of course, but it is a useful heuristic in organizing the state
of CPG. At best, the current formulation of the theory makes theoretical predictions
in only two of the four possible permutations of party distributions: when majorities
become more homogenous. It makes no predictions when majorities are heteroge-
nous, and it implicitly assumes that there will just be “more” party government if
homogenous majorities face heterogenous minorities (rather than homogenous ones)
but does not quantify this difference or offer any predictions on its form.8 Ad-
ditionally, the theory implicitly assumes that these conditions will occur alongside
divergence between the parties. Yet it is possible to observe any of these party config-
urations between parties that are both polarized and unpolarized. A comprehensive
theory of lawmaking would rectify this deficiency by supplementing and extending
these core predictions for each of the potentially observable configurations of the
parties.
8Other work on CPG, such as that of Smith and Gamm (2009, 143), which attempt to test the
theory rely on the same, broad theoretical expectations that are difficult to test.
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Additionally, in practice, almost all testing of CPG at the Congressional level has
been by case studies. Case studies are valuable, but it is inadequate to test a theory
that changes expectations based on conditions that vary over time by non-randomly
selecting incidents that validate the theory. A rigorous, over time test of the theory is
necessary, demonstrating both how the varying satisfaction of the conditions of CPG
affects specific leader powers and the source of the variation in those conditions.
The dissertation, then, offers original and systematic predictions, grounded in
previous literature, to rectify these inconsistencies and articulate CPG as a full the-
ory of lawmaking. This full theory makes theoretical predictions across all possible
permutations of party arrangements. The dissertation also uses original measures of
the restrictiveness of the lawmaking process to test the new, expanded theory in a
truly longitudinal way. These theoretical goals are outlined more fully in the next
section.
1.3 Theoretical Goals of the Dissertation
Any full statement of CPG as a theory of lawmaking must trace it from the elec-
toral connection, to the composition of the parties in Congress, to the powers those
parties are endowed with, to the type of policy they produce. The major deficiencies
in CPG, as it stands, are its failure to make clear theoretical predictions at the third
step and its failure to provide a comprehensive, quantitative test of the whole pro-
cess over time. The dissertation provides specific, enumerated, testable hypotheses
regarding each step in this set of linkages. To be fair, some of these hypotheses, such
as the electoral connection, are simply restatements of past hypotheses from CPG
literature. Later, though, I describe data and a research design to actually test all
of these hypotheses (and, as such, the theory comprehensively) simultaneously. This
is a clear contribution to CPG research.
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Once MCs arrive in the House, their preferences aggregate, by party identification,
to form a distribution of party preferences. CPG expects these distributions to be
relatively homogenous or heterogenous within parties and to be either relatively
similar or dissimilar across parties. However, it only provides diffuse theoretical
expectations for when certain combinations of these conditions are met (see Table
1.1). Moreover, a latent assumption of the theory is that the conditions will be
met simultaneously, meaning that it makes no predictions for when only some of the
conditions are met. But in reality, we can (and do) observe heterogenous majorities
in the face of homogenous minorities.9 Accordingly, we should develop theoretical
predictions for each of the three expectations (outlined in Table 1.1) for each of the
possible distributions of parties.10
Recall that the three expectations of CPG (when the condition is increasingly
satisfied) are increasing leader powers, increasing expectations of the use of those
powers, and partisan policy outputs as a result of the use of those powers. An
important theoretical concept, then, is what those leadership powers actually entail.
A clarifying distinction is important here. Those powers that are used to structure
the policy agenda of the House are known as substantive powers, while the powers
that are used to structure the debate and passage of policy within the House are
known as procedural powers (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008, Cox and McCubbins
2005). Within each type of power are two broad types. Negative powers are the
ability to keep those items that are despised by the majority of the majority party
9For instance, recall the heterogenous Democratic party in the face of an increasingly homoge-
nous Republican party in the 1970s, with only a small amount of ideological separation (Sundquist
1983). CPG makes no specific prediction for such cases.
10Other work, such as Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) focuses on the dimensions of intraparty
unity and divisiveness between parties. It makes hypotheses about the extent of party influence,
but makes no predictions on the tenor of policy outcomes and fails to recognize the importance of
the unity of the opposite party. Any test of the theory outlined above, then, naturally encompasses
such literature.
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off the floor; positive powers are the ability to get those items that are favored by
the majority of the majority party onto the floor.
The complete theory articulated in this dissertation encompasses all of the above
powers and conditions. For each potential distribution of parties (homogenous or
heterogenous, both majority and minority), paired with their possible degrees of
ideological separation, it makes predictions for observed use of majority substantive
and procedural powers (both positive and negative), minority use of substantive and
procedural powers (both positive and negative), and the observed policy outputs from
the use of such powers. It then tests these predictions, using an original dataset
of over 2,400 rules, each content-analyzed to determine its restrictiveness. These
predictions are tested primarily using Partial Adjustment Models and Vector Auto-
Regressions (VAR), given the endogeneity among the key concepts in the theory.
Additionally, the dissertation explores the effects of lawmaking on two other
important concepts: representation and approval. The degree and character of po-
litical representation are addressed by a body of scholarship with much intellectual
history. Several different forms of representation theory exist, both at the aggregate
and dyadic level. One theoretical characterization of representation is the so-called
“standard model” (Hill n. d.). Originating with Kuklinski (1977), in this concep-
tualization, one-way linkages run from constituency preferences to policy outputs,
with a separate influence coming from the party identification of the member. Much
evidence has been gathered in support of this instructed-delegate model of represen-
tation (for example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001b; Canes-Wrone, Brady,
and Cogan 2002; Clinton 2006; Griffin 2006).
There is strong reason to believe that the fit of this model varies systematically
with CPG. First, the model explicitly includes a term for the party identification of
the MC. CPG notes that, as the composition of parties changes, they use increasing
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amounts of positive substantive and procedural powers to achieve increasingly parti-
san legislation. Thus the strength of the party identification dummy variable should
vary as the “condition” of CPG varies. Second, the electoral connection assumes that
the preferences of MCs come from their constituencies. So even if policy is becoming
more extreme as a result of substantive and procedural powers, it might be reflecting
the aggregate preferences of the majority party in the electorate, rather than the
electorate as a whole. Accordingly, we should expect that the quality of represen-
tation might not be changing over time, but the constituency represented might be
changing as a result of increasing CPG. These diffuse predictions are formalized and
tested in later sections.
The dissertation also investigates the effects of CPG on public approval of Congress.
Some research exists on the determinants of Congressional approval over time. Some
of that work has found that Congressional approval varies negatively with institu-
tional strife as operationalized through veto overrides, conflict, and scandals (Durr,
Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997) and partisan lawmaking generally (Ramirez 2009).
This work, however, has largely ignored the changing ideological composition of
both the electorate and of Congress.
The full theory of CPG offered in the dissertation implies some revisions to our
current understanding of Congressional approval. As polarization increases at both
the elite and mass levels, Republicans should be particularly satisfied with Congress
when it is controlled by Republicans (and ostensibly pushing Republican policy goals)
and particularly dissatisfied with Congress when it is controlled by Democrats (vice
versa for Democrats) precisely because of the increasing use of the substantive and
procedural powers to accomplish partisan goals outlined above. Traditionally, we
would expect that when a homogenous Republican majority uses special rules to pass
partisan legislation it should lower overall evaluations of the institution (Ramirez
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2009, Ramirez 2013). But these dynamics should be the exact opposite by party
identification. That is, it should drastically raise approval among Republicans and
drastically lower approval among Democrats. Again, these predictions are formalized
and tested in subsequent sections.
To be clear, the resulting predictions for representation and approval only arise
because of the fully explicated theoretical predictions for CPG. The main work, both
theoretical and empirical, of the dissertation is developing and testing that full set
of predictions.
1.4 Research Beyond the Scope of the Dissertation
It is important to clarify what will not be covered in the research at hand. First
and foremost, tests of the theory will focus on the United States House of Represen-
tatives. To be sure, CPG is a theory that can be tested in a variety of legislatures.
All it requires is two principally competing parties and a legislative process in which
party leadership has the opportunity to influence procedure. Focusing on the House,
however, offers a variety of advantages. Most notably, its structure allows for party
leadership to have either relatively little control over the legislative process (by defer-
ring entirely to the Rules Committee) or relatively absolute control (by controlling
the Rules Committee for partisan ends). Additionally, this control is straightfor-
ward to measure by focusing on the rules released by that committee. In contrast,
the Senate operates almost exclusively on a series of unanimous consent agreements,
given the autonomy allowed to each individual Senator (Oleszek 2011). Measuring
the circumstances around these agreements, for instance, is much more difficult.
Additionally, the House provides more variation in many of the independent and
dependent variables. With regards to lawmaking, there are more avenues to exercise
procedural control in the House. There is also reason to believe that representational
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processes are stronger in the House (because of a more direct linkage of MCs to
constituencies), and most survey respondents think of the House when approving
of the institution of Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Finally, almost all
existing work on CPG focuses on the House of Representatives, as well. Thus the
work here builds on the principal foundation of prior research on CPG.
Second, the dissertation is not a theory about the causes of polarization. The
electoral connection of CPG assumes that MCs are a reflection of their constituency.
Accordingly, if MCs grow more extreme over time, constituencies are growing more
extreme over time. I am not out to uncover the root cause of this increasing ide-
ological extremity; I defer to other work on polarization. Instead, I assume that
electoral polarization grows over time as a result of some sort of exogenous change in
the system, much like Theriault (2008, 55). The planned methodological work will
account for the potential endogeneity between mass polarization, elite polarization,
and lawmaking. However, it does not seek to explain the causal process behind the
increases and decreases in that polarization.
Third, the dissertation will test each of the phenomena at the national level. That
is, I will use “national” preferences and distributions of constituency preferences,
rather than district-level ones. This is simply out of necessity. No quality measures
of district-level constituency ideology exist over time, and the popular proxy measure
of the presidential vote share in the constituency suffers from poor validity and
reliability (Hill and Jordan n. d., Leogrande and Jeydel 1997).
Fourth, I have referred, at several points, to the theory explicated in the dis-
sertation as a “full” or “complete” theory of CPG. That is, it makes theoretical
predictions for each of the potentially observable distributions of parties.11 In em-
11The following sections make hypotheses regarding the stylized compositions of parties suggested
in Table 1.2, but tests those predictions across the permutations.
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pirical reality, however, some of these distributions have never been observed in the
United States House of Representatives. As a result, the test of the theory might not
be comprehensive, even though the theory itself is. In the words of Holton (1952,
138), sometimes only the “smallest part of reality” of some possible observable phe-
nomenon is presented to us directly, though our explanations should try and account
for the entire theoretical iceberg. The complete description of the theory advanced
here might not be matched by raw data in the observed world: but “theories are more
complete descriptions than obtained data, since they describe processes and entities
in their unobserved as well as in their observed states” (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz,
and Sechrest 1966). The dissertation tests all the components of the theory possible,
given empirical reality, but attempts to explain lawmaking more generally than its
narrow empirical realities.
1.5 Outline
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates and clarifies
the predictions of CPG theory, as broadly alluded to here. It then tests the theory
over time, rather than using the traditional case study approach employed in the
CPG literature. Section 3 integrates CPG with theories of representation, specifically
generating and testing the logical implications of polarization for representation.
Section 4 tests the implications of polarization (with insights driven by CPG) for
evaluations of the institution of Congress, as outlined above. Section 5 concludes.
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2. A DETAILED TEST OF CONDITIONAL PARTY GOVERNMENT
The previous section outlined the broad goal of detailing a full theory of Condi-
tional Party Government. Recall that such a theory requires predictions for the use of
positive and negative powers, both procedural and substantive, for both the majority
and minority party, when those parties are separated ideologically and when they
are not. In this section, I elaborate on that full theory. I then detail the data that I
use to test this newly formed theory of lawmaking, taking care to demonstrate how
certain patterns of lawmaking through rules meet the criteria for positive and nega-
tive power. Finally, with theory and data in hand, I test the principal predictions of
the theory.
2.1 A Fully Elaborated Theory of Conditional Party Government
Recall that any full statement of CPG as a theory of lawmaking must trace
it from the electoral connection, to the composition of the parties in Congress, to
the powers those parties are endowed with, to the type of policy they produce.
Accordingly, the elaboration provided here begins with the electorate. CPG theory
implies that electoral processes shape the preferences of MCs when they arrive in the
House (Aldrich and Rohde 1998). Subsequently, more polarized constituencies (with
Republicans at one pole and Democrats at another) should send more polarizing
(with more extreme preferences) members to Congress. Accordingly, we have H1:
H1: The more extreme the constituency, the more extreme the preferences of the
Member of Congress who represents the constituency.
H1 literally brings MCs to Congress, respecting that their preferences (and their
incentive to comply with the party) are shaped by the electoral connection.
Once MCs arrive in the House, their preferences aggregate, by party identification,
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to form a distribution of party preferences. CPG expects these distributions to
be relatively homogenous or heterogenous within parties and to be either relatively
similar or dissimilar across parties. However, existing presentations of the theory only
provide theoretical expectations for when certain combinations of these conditions
are met (see Table 1.1). Moreover, a latent assumption of the theory is that the
conditions will be met simultaneously, meaning that it makes no predictions for
when only some of the conditions are met.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 clarify the point. (For consistency, I always depict the party
on the left as in the majority.) CPG only makes predictions as parties move from
the arrangement in 2.1(a) to 2.2(b) because of the latent assumption that as the
arrangement of parties shifts in terms of their homogeneity or heterogeneity, inter-
party distance also increases. But in reality, we can observe any of the other six
distributions.1 Accordingly, we should develop theoretical predictions for each of the
three expectations (outlined in Table 1.1) for each of the eight possible distributions
of parties.
Recall that the three expectations of CPG (when the condition is increasingly
satisfied) are increasing leader powers, the expectation of the use of those powers,
and partisan policy outputs as a result of the use of those powers. For the sake of
clarity, I repeat the distinction made in the previous section in regards to the specific
types of powers available to each party. Those powers that are used to structure the
policy agenda of the House are known as substantive powers, while the powers that
are used to structure the debate and passage of policy within the House are known as
procedural powers (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008, Cox and McCubbins 2005). Within
each type of power are two broad classes of power. Negative powers are the ability to
1For instance, recall the heterogenous Democratic party in the face of an increasingly homoge-
nous Republican party in the 1970s, with only a small amount of ideological separation (Sundquist
1983). This configuration would fall under Figure 2.1(c). CPG makes no prediction for such cases.
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(b) Homogenous Majority; Heterogenous
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(c) Heterogenous Majority; Homogenous
Minority.
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(d) Homogenous Majority; Homogenous
Minority.
Figure 2.1: Hypothetical Distributions of Parties: Unpolarized
keep those items that are despised by the majority of the majority party off the floor;
positive powers are the ability to get those items that are favored by the majority
of the majority party onto the floor. We will consider each in turn, specifying how
each power should vary for both the majority and minority party according to the
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(d) Homogenous Majority; Homogenous
Minority.
Figure 2.2: Hypothetical Distributions of Parties: Polarized
distribution of each party and the ideological separation between them.
Negative substantive powers are the ability to keep policy goals that run against
the majority of the majority party off the floor. Necessarily, this is an agenda setting
power. Theoretical expectations here are indicated clearly by past research: negative
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substantive powers are invariant over time. Using “roll rates” (how often legislation
passes that the majority of the majority party does not like), Cox and McCubbins
(2005) demonstrate that the majority is hardly ever rolled, suggesting that its ability
to keep legislation off the floor, through negative agenda setting, does not vary over
time. Accordingly, any theory of CPG that accounts for when the condition is not
met must account for the invariance of negative substantive powers.
Positive substantive powers are the ability to pass policy goals that are preferred
by the majority of the majority party, necessarily skewed away from the floor median
(Krehbiel 1998). Current CPG suggests that positive substantive powers grow as the
condition of CPG is increasingly met. Positive party goals, though, should not rely
on the shape of the minority party or the separation between the parties. When the
majority party is heterogenous, it is costly for leadership to exert enough discipline
to get heterogenous members to vote with party proposals. As the majority party
grows more homogenous, more members naturally want to vote with party proposals
(Aldrich 2011, 205). This is invariant to the shape of the minority party and the
amount of ideological separation between the parties. Positive substantive power,
then, is only conditional on the shape of the majority party.
Policy goals, though, are contingent on ideological separation. In either Figure
2.1(b) or 2.1(d), the majority party can pursue positive policy goals. These goals,
though, will differ only a little from the floor median, given that the party itself does
not want to pursue very partisan policy. The homogenous majority in Figures 2.2(b)
and 2.2(d) can pursue substantive goals that are much more partisan than the floor
median. In other words, the substantive power of all the homogenous parties is the
same, but the policy outcomes as a result of exercising that power vary according to
ideological separation.
As a result of the negative power of the majority party, the minority party should
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never have either positive or negative substantive control. In functional terms, this
means that the minority party should never pass a bill (or amendment) that is
antithetical to the interests of the majority of the majority party.
Positive and negative procedural powers are more difficult to define. Finocchiaro
and Rohde (2008), the prevailing work on CPG and its implications for procedural
powers, define positive and negative procedural powers parallel to positive and neg-
ative substantive powers. That is, negative procedural powers are the ability to keep
procedural rules disliked by a majority of the majority party off the floor, while posi-
tive procedural powers are the ability to structure procedural rules in a way preferred
by the majority of the majority party. As they note, this conceptual distinction is
particularly difficult to retain in empirical reality, given that positive rules are often
accompanied by negative rules. In their words, “although special rules are inherently
a vehicle for positive action, they will often involve blocking alternative proposals”
(Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008, 38).
I suggest that both structuring debate and blocking minority party proposals are
positive forms of procedural control. Like negative substantive powers, true negative
procedural power lies in never allowing the minority party to structure the rules of
debate (much like never allowing the minority party to structure the agenda). It
makes little sense to define negative procedural rules as taking positive action (that
is, instituting a special rule) to forbid the minority from entering any alternatives.
Instead, negative procedural power is not allowing the minority party to structure
the actual rules of debate.
An aside on the mechanics of action in the House is necessary here to explicate
the measurement of these concepts.2 A prime example of procedural powers is the
use of special and restrictive rules when considering legislation. The process for
2For a good discussion of this process, see Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008).
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instituting these special rules is as follows. The special rule is reported from the
Rules Committee. Debate on the rule itself, like all other legislation on the House
floor, is managed by a majority-party designated floor manager. At the end of the
time for debate, the floor manager can order the previous question on the rule. If the
majority party loses this vote, the minority party gains (as opposed to the majority
party) control of the debate of the resolution. This control allows them to offer
whatever minority-party (substantive) amendments they like to the rule at hand.
The consequences of losing the previous question, then, are steep for the majority
party. However, if it wins the previous question, the rule proceeds to an immediate
up-or-down vote on the text as written. It completely precludes any opportunity
for the minority party to offer amendments or points of order. This protects, in an
absolute sense, the procedural or substantive goals written into the rule.
More generally, constructing a special rule requires majority party control of the
Rules Committee and a Rules Committee amenable to being used as a partisan
agent in structuring debate. Of course, the Rules Committee has gone through
various institutional reforms to make it become a partisan agent. A full theory of
CPG would predict these institutional changes. That is, when I claim that positive
and negative procedural power should be used according to different distributions
of the parties, it necessarily implies that, if that power does not currently exist, the
majority party will institute institutional reforms to create that power from within
an institution. The longitudinal tests offered here do not deal specifically with these
institutional changes—attempting to codify committee reform and the invention of
new types of rules is exceptionally difficult. However, the theory still predicts them.
Having described this process, we are now in a position to specify how both posi-
tive and negative procedural powers should vary over time. The use of positive proce-
dural powers—the explicitly advantageous structuring of procedure on the floor—by
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the majority party should vary according to the composition of the minority party.
As the minority party grows more homogenous, its opposition to the employment of
positive substantive power grows more credible because the homogeneity of member
preferences reduces the cost of minority leadership enforcing minority opposition to
majority bills (much like majority homogeneity increases the natural incentive for
party members to vote with the party majority). In the face of unilateral opposition,
the majority party should attempt to use positive procedural power more often in
order to control the debate on the floor. This tendency should increase, moreover,
when the separation between the parties is high. As the “stakes rise,” homogenous
minority parties are even more likely to fight majority party positions (as they are in-
creasingly opposed to the minority party’s own preferred policies). Majority parties,
then, should exercise positive procedural control the most in the face of homogenous
minority parties that are ideologically different from their own preferences. (Like-
wise, if these procedural powers do not exist within the institution, the majority
party should create them.)
Negative procedural powers for the majority, like negative substantive powers,
should be invariant over time. That is, the majority party should never allow the
minority party to structure the debate on the floor.
What should we expect with procedural power and the minority party?3 The
opposition (on rules votes) should rise as the ideological divergence between the
parties increases, as losing the rule results in increasingly costly procedure that the
minority party dislikes. We can view this opposition to special rules as a sort of
minority negative power: an attempt to keep the floor debate as the status quo.4
3I focus here on the application of the theory in the House in particular. In the Senate, negative
procedural powers would be embodied by practices like the filibuster (Koger 2010). More generally,
though, the theory makes predictions about when positive and negative substantive and procedural
powers will be used, giving specific examples of the types of powers in the House.
4This is similar to Aldrich’s (2011, 205) logic: the minority party can settle on what not to seek
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Admittedly, CPG is relatively more interesting in its predictions for majority
parties than for minorities. This is simply due to the nature of majority rule in the
House. As a result of winning elections, the majority party wins the opportunity to
structure both procedure and substance to their advantage. Without more explicit
channels for minority influence—like the Senate’s filibuster—the theory is left to
predict the changing nature of minority opposition to the majority.
We now have complete predictions for the usage of positive and negative substan-
tive and procedural powers, fulfilling our need to formalize the powers the parties
are endowed with. All that remains is the type of policy they produce. The pre-
diction here is strongly implied by previous research (Aldrich 2011). Partisan policy
outputs are more guaranteed with the successful use of positive procedural powers:
keeping minority legislation off of the floor and preserving a policy output aligned
with majority party preferences. So policy outputs should grow more partisan (in the
direction of the majority party) as positive procedural power is used. The stronger
predictor of policy outputs, however, is the degree of ideological separation between
the parties. As the majority party grows more ideologically distinct from the minor-
ity party, policy outputs will more strongly resemble the preferences of the majority
than the floor median, as implied by the increasing use of positive substantive pow-
ers. When this is coupled with positive procedural powers, legislation should be the
most partisan. In the latter circumstances, it is both reflective of a distinctive ma-
jority party and immunity from changes on the floor by the minority party, due to
procedural power.
I formalize the theoretical predictions from the above paragraphs below. In all
instances, sub-hypothesis a refers to majority powers, sub-hypothesis b refers to mi-
nority powers, and sub-hypothesis c refers to the tenor of policy outputs. Addition-
even if unable to agree on what to seek for themselves.
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ally, each hypothesis refers to the average activity for any given Congress (average
use of powers and average policy outputs).
When both parties are heterogenous and relatively similar (Figure 2.1(a)):
H2a : The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and negative
procedural power.
H2b : The minority party will exercise neither type of substantive or procedural
power.
H2c : Policy outputs will be only barely more partisan than the floor median
(in the direction of the majority party).
When the majority is homogenous and the minority is heterogenous, and the parties
are relatively similar (Figure 2.1(b)):
H3a : The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive
power and negative procedural power.
H3b : The minority party will exercise neither type of substantive or procedural
power.
H3c : Policy outputs will be somewhat more partisan than the floor median (in
the direction of the majority party).
When the majority is heterogenous and the minority is homogenous, and the parties
are relatively similar (Figure 2.1(c)):
H4a : The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and both
positive and negative procedural power.
H4b : The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise
negative procedural power.5
H4c : Policy outputs will be only barely more partisan than the floor median
(in the direction of the majority party).
When both parties are homogenous and relatively similar (Figure 2.1(d)):
H5a : The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive
power as well as both positive and negative procedural power.
H5b : The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise
negative procedural power.
H5c : Policy outputs will be somewhat more partisan than the floor median (in
the direction of the majority party).
5Recall that the minority party’s negative power is attempting to defeat the use of those powers
by the majority. These attempts are mostly unsuccessful, but the attempt is the same as exercising
the power.
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When both parties are heterogenous and relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(a)):
H6a : The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and negative
procedural power.
H6b : The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise
negative procedural power.
H6c : Policy outputs will be more partisan than the floor median (in the
direction of the majority party).
When the majority is homogenous and the minority is heterogenous, and the parties
are relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(b)):
H7a : The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive
power and negative procedural power.
H7b : The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise
negative procedural power.
H7c : Policy outputs will be much more partisan than the floor median (in the
direction of the majority party).
When the majority is heterogenous and the minority is homogenous, and the parties
are relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(c)):
H8a : The majority party will exercise negative substantive power and both
positive and negative procedural power.
H8b : The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise
negative procedural power.
H8c : Policy outputs will be more partisan than the floor median (in the
direction of the majority party).
When both parties are homogenous and relatively polarized (Figure 2.2(d)):
H9a : The majority party will exercise both positive and negative substantive
power as well as both positive and negative procedural power.
H9b : The minority party will exercise no substantive power but will exercise
negative procedural power.
H9c : Policy outputs will be much more partisan than the floor median (in the
direction of the majority party).
These hypotheses are shown in Table 2.1, which maps to the hypothetical distri-
butions in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.6
6Other work, such as Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) focuses on the dimensions of intraparty
unity and divisiveness between parties. It makes hypotheses about the extent of party influence,
but makes no predictions on the tenor of policy outcomes and fails to recognize the importance of
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Table 2.1: CPG: Revised Predictions According with Varying Degrees of the “Con-
dition”
Majority Party
Heterogenous Homogenous
Minority Heterogenous H2a , H2b , and H2c H3a , H3b , and H3c
Party Low
Homogenous H4a , H4b , and H4c H5a , H5b , and H5c
Ideological
Separation
Heterogenous Homogenous
Minority Heterogenous H6a , H6b , and H6c H7a , H7b , and H7c
Party
High
Homogenous H8a , H8b , and H8c H9a , H9b , and H9c
It should be apparent that the hypotheses for many of the permutations of the
distributions of parties are equivalent despite whether the parties are similar or dis-
similar. (Note, for instance, that H4a is equivalent to H8a .) What separates these
hypotheses is whether or not the exercise of these powers is successful. For instance,
the majority party can introduce a special rule and then be defeated on that rule
by the minority party—a phenomenon we observe multiple times. This is not a ma-
jority roll, but a majority defeat (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008). We never expect
the unity of the opposite party. Any test of the theory outlined above, then, naturally encompasses
such literature.
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the majority to be rolled (we always expect negative substantive and procedural
power to prevail), but we do not expect for the majority to always be successful
when they attempt to exercise positive power. The mitigating factor is the degree
of difference between the parties. As the ideological stakes of passing the positive
party agenda rise, party leadership should be more successful in exercising positive
power, both substantive and procedural. If distance is low, the cost of members
defecting (crossover voting) is much lower than if distance is high. In other words,
as we move from the top to bottom of Table 2.1, we expect the success of positive
powers to change, even if the attempted usage of positive powers remains constant.
Accordingly, I offer H10:
H10: The successful use of positive majority powers increases as the ideological
separation between the parties increases.
The converse is true for negative procedural powers by the minority (successfully
opposing the use of majority positive power). As the stakes rise, the majority party
should never let negative minority powers be used successfully. Thus, H11:
H11: The successful use of negative minority (procedural) powers decreases as
the ideological separation between the parties increases.
Collectively, H1 to H11 lay out a comprehensive theory of CPG, covering all
possible permutations of whether the “condition” of CPG is met. We still need to
operationalize the actual use of these powers. For that, I turn to a detailed discussion
of the nature and types of rules used in the House.
H10 and H11 are not directly tested in the dissertation, though they can easily be
tested in the future. For the current application, I am more interested in explaining
the systematic use of rules, regardless of if they are used successfully. But the reader
should take comfort in a few minor points. First, rules are rarely used unsuccessfully.
So the analyses here are not misleading in the sense of explaining the pattern of
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rules that are introduced but abandoned. Second, a comprehensive test of each
hypothesis would make this section too complicated. Instead, I choose to test those
(secondary) hypotheses at a later date. In the same vein, not all of the hypotheses
regarding the behavior of the minority party are tested, either. We know very little
systematically about the usage of rules by the majority party, where they have the
strongest potential to affect the direction of policy. As such, this section focuses on
testing those hypotheses first.
Further, I recognize that the hypothetical distributions of parties—of fully ho-
mogenous ones versus heterogenous ones, severely overlapping or severely polarized—
presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and referenced in previous tables are meant to be
used as heuristics for understanding how parties operate in idealized circumstances.
It is certainly possible to test those specific hypotheses in the traditional, case-study
manner (identifying when a set of parties meets the idealized distributions and exam-
ining their behavior). Here, though, I recognize that parties can fall into a variety of
homogenous or heterogenous shapes. The empirical tests account for the full range
of the theoretical variables.
Lastly, it should be noted that the analyses executed here are all time serial in
nature, though the predictions offered above are all cross-sectional (predictions based
of a single, static arrangement of the parties). When testing the theory, then, I do
not test a singular hypothesis alone. Rather, the theoretical tests consider moving
from one arrangement to another, and, as such, moving across hypotheses.
2.2 Previous Work with Rules
There is no lack of study on the use of rules. The literature can broadly be
classified into two subsets: one which focuses on the use of rules within a single
Congress (with the unit of analysis often the single rule), and another which focuses
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on the variation in rules as institutional factors vary (with the unit of analysis often
the year or Congress).
In the first strain, three theories emerge as potential explanations for the use of
rules. Informational theory (Krehbiel 1991) assumes that rules reduce uncertainty
on the House floor caused by the complexities of legislative topics and the amending
activity that might happen in any given session. Distributive theory (Mayhew 1974,
Ferejohn 1974) assumes that rules exist to facilitate the distribution of policy benefits
among members of Congress. Lastly, partisan theories (Binder 1997, Rohde 1991,
among others) assume that the Rules Committee exists to help accomplish policy
goals of the majority party. Among these theories, partisan theories consistently
receive the most empirical support (Marshall 2002).
Even though partisan explanations of the use of rules routinely receive the most
support, the evidence for these explanations is still quite limited. While we have
strong evidence predicting the partisan behavior of the Rules Committee within a
certain Congress, such as more restrictive rules on more partisan legislation (Marshall
2002), we have weak evidence relating this behavior to systematic factors such as
polarization and party competition. Much of the former work characterizes the use
of restrictive rules within a single Congress (Krehbiel 1997, Marshall 2002, Sinclair
1994), and much of the latter work analyzes special rules in a case-study approach
(Rohde and Aldrich 2010).
The core problem of our traditional characterization of special rules is that it is too
simplistic. As early as Bach and Smith (1988), scholars adopted the Rules Committee
convention of defining open, modified open, modified closed, and closed rules on the
basis of amending activity allowed on the floor (for a precise definition of these
categories, see Marshall 2002).7 These categories might have been useful when rules
7It’s worth noting that the Rules Committee still continues this practice, characterizing their
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were relatively benign (as we will discover was the case in the “textbook” Congress
period), but a flurry of strategic development in special rules led to measures that
are grossly oversimplified. To illustrate the point, consider House Resolution 477,
reported in the 112th Congress (House Committee on Rules 2011). In part, the
resolution reads
[I]t shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the five-minute rule an amendment in the nature of
a substitute consisting of the text of the Rules Committee Print dated
November 18, 2011. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall
be considered as read. All points of order against that amendment in the
nature of a substitute are waived. No amendment to that amendment in
the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in part
A of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution.
Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the
report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall
be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the
report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent,
shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand
for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the
Whole.
Note that the resolution not only prohibits amending activity on the floor (as a classic
“closed rule”). It also makes only a single amendment in the nature of a substitute in
order (which supersedes all of the original text of the bill), only makes one amendment
to that substitute in order (which was crafted in the Rules Committee), and prohibits
second degree amendments to the amendment in the nature of the substitute. In
essence, the Rules Committee is drafting legislation in committee and demanding
an up-or-down vote on the House floor. Treating this rule as a simple “closed rule”
misses much of the procedural nuance that accompanies contemporary resolutions.
Additionally, scholars have traditionally treated all rules reported from the Rules
Committee as a signal of restrictiveness (for one among many examples, see Finoc-
rules into these categories, despite their dubious utility (see House Committee on Rules 2012).
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chiaro and Rohde 2008). Yet even in the “textbook” Congress, the Rules Committee
was an active agent simply because of the vast hurdles encountered when scheduling
legislation to come to the floor. The rules reported, however, were not restrictive in
the classic sense: they brought legislation to the floor under open conditions because
the likelihood of legislation reaching the floor for debate was low without scheduling
assistance. Once on the floor, however, these rules provided for open debate and
amendment under normal House procedures.
The larger point is that restrictive rules are conceptually distinct from other
scheduling rules. “Rule” does not mean special rule or restrictive rule. It is simply a
resolution reported by the Rules Committee for the purpose of scheduling legislation.
If a rule is restrictive, however, it is not enough to simply define it as “open” or
“closed.” Rules can (and do) vary widely in their restrictiveness and openness. But
the extent of that openness should be a key part of our analyses of these rules, not
whether or not a rule was reported from committee.
This mistaken conceptualization matters for research. Using raw counts of all
rules reported from committee to test theories of lawmaking potentially leads to
bias due to confusing the open with the restrictive. Polarization might not seem
to affect the issuance of rules, but this finding might emerge for no other reason
than that scholars are searching for conflict on open rules. (Later in this section, I
demonstrate exactly that: analyzing rules in the aggregate leads to starkly different
inferences than treating them separately.) At their core, theories of lawmaking are
concerned with the rise in restrictiveness in the process: so we should not bias our
understanding by unknowingly examining both restrictive and open rules together.
This critique of the state of the field is not meant to indict any given piece of
research. To be sure, there are practical reasons that we have defaulted to our current
oversimplification of the essence and nature of rules. First, rules are notoriously
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hard to access. Digitized, plain text versions of House Resolutions only exist for
years after 1990. Before that time period, scholars are forced to comb through the
Congressional Record for printed resolutions. A particularly cumbersome resource,
the Congressional Record produces upwards of 200 pages of recorded proceedings
from the House and Senate every calendar day. And these were not accessible to
the academic community, except through hard copy, until the advent of large-scale
online databases. Reading through them is tedious, even if the analyst knows exactly
what he or she is looking for. (An example of a rule printed in the Congressional
Record can be found in Figure 2.3.) So at the time we were building our theories of
the usage of rules, the omission of this resource was largely out of sheer practicality.
In addition, we now benefit from a wide range of text analysis software that aids
in the processing of voluminous text. Reliably coding the thousands of rules used in
even the second-half of the twentieth century was a dubious and daunting task. But
modern programs like Python and R (with text mining extensions like tm [Feinerer,
Hornik, and Meyer 2008]) greatly reduce the analyst’s workload in constructing and
coding text-based documents for analysis. With a given, well defined set of search
criteria, one can relatively easily identify various aspects of text documents (like
rules) for given patterns.
The following data collection effort leverages both of these new resources, along
with a systematic qualitative evaluation of the nature of special rules over time, to
develop a set of criteria by which to code the restrictiveness of rules over time. The
goal is to develop measures that can be used to systematically (and appropriately)
test the theory elaborated above. The first step is the definition of our search criteria,
a task I turn to in the next section.
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 Figure 2.3: Average Congressional Record Page.
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2.3 Rules and Coding Criteria
While rules reported from the Rules Committee vary greatly in their scope and
purpose, they tend to vary predictably in their structure and language. The reason
for this systematic repetition is twofold. The first is that, like all floor debate, rules
reported by the Rules Committee must follow basic parliamentary procedures. So
when rules waive points of order, for instance, they must do so in the “correct”
fashion to be legitimate and effective.
The second is that when the Rules Committee finds a rule effective at accomplish-
ing a particular goal, they are apt to use its structure again. Consider the king-of-the-
hill procedure, by which the House can vote for (and adopt) multiple amendments,
but, in the case of multiple adoptions, only the last amendment adopted is considered
finally adopted in the House. As long as the majority party orders the amendments
correctly, this structure gives members political cover by allowing them to vote “yea”
on amendments that their constituencies prefer (but the majority party does not)
and vote “yea” on amendments that the majority party prefers for final passage.
This dual opportunity for position-taking (by the member) and policymaking (by
the party) accomplishes competing goals. As such, it has been used many times by
the majority party. For our purposes, the critical aspect for the analyst is that, each
time it is used, it uses identical or near-identical language to structure the rule.
This repetition in structure and language gives the analyst the opportunity to
code, relatively straightforwardly, instances of certain types of rules being used over
time. The only requirement, of course, is that we know which patterns are important.
A systematic qualitative evaluation of the rules suggests three key repeating types
of restrictive rules.
The first type is a self-executing rule that adopts an amendment outlined in the
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resolution. In the text of rules, these are introduced with the following language:
“an amendment [in the nature of a substitute] . . . shall be considered as adopted.”
These rules are restrictive in the most basic sense. They preclude the opportunity
for debate on the amendment on the floor, and they preclude the opportunity for the
minority party to vote against an amendment they may not agree with ideologically.
In our theoretical framework, these rules occupy positive substantive powers for the
majority. They completely alter legislation without any opportunity for minority
party participation in the legislative process. Moreover, substitute amendments are
particularly restrictive, as they replace the entire text of a bill with the substitute
amendment, in essence stripping all authority from the committee from which the
bill was originally reported.
The second is similar in nature, but not as positive. It prioritizes amendments,
but it does not go so far as to consider them as adopted. In the text of rules,
these are introduced with the following language: “an amendment [in the nature
of a substitute] . . . shall be considered as read.” They clearly set the agenda for
debate of legislation by establishing priority to the consideration of majority-selected
amendments.
The third type is clearly negative as it restricts the amendments allowed to be
offered on the floor. In the text of rules, these are introduced with the following
language: “no amendment shall be in order except . . ..” These rules are essential
in offering the Rules Committee (and subsequently the majority party) complete
control over reducing uncertainty on the floor. The amendments that are allowed
to be offered often come from many jurisdictions, like the Congressional Record or
the committee with original jurisdiction. They are not necessarily positive substan-
tively, but definitely procedurally. They structure the nature of the debate itself to
advantage the majority party without necessarily advancing a substantive goal.
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Note the advantages of coding these types separately. It avoids dichotomizing
rules into overly simple categories of “open” and “closed.” It reveals the wide range
of flexibility available to the Rules Committee when constructing rules. Additionally,
the categories can be combined to demonstrate a wider spectrum of restrictiveness
(for instance, a rule can consider a substitute amendment as adopted [type 1] and
forbid amendment to that amendment [type 3]). Yet this coding structure retains
a longitudinal, quantitative measure that can be used to test theories of lawmaking
over time.
I used Python to identify and code each of these types of rules. The Python script
used was a simple program that searches a folder of documents for a user-defined
regular expression, establishes a user-defined window around any located matches,
and prints the window in a new document if said window also includes additional
terms defined by the user (or, conversely, does not include terms).
For the first type, amendments considered as adopted, I searched the rules database
for instances of the word “amendment*” with a window five words to the left and
fifty words to the right. The window also had to include “nature,” “substitute,”
“consider*,” and “adopt*,” and must not include “whole” (to except phrases that
flag the Committee of the Whole rising) or “last” (for resolutions instituting a king-
of-the-hill procedure).
For the second type, amendments considered as read, I searched the rules database
for instances of the word “amendment*” with a window five words to the left and
eighty words to the right. The window also had to include “nature,” “substitute,”
“consider*,” and “read,” and must not include “whole” (to except phrases that flag
the Committee of the Whole rising), “last” (for resolutions instituting a king-of-the-
hill procedure), or “adopt*” (to preclude rules in type 1).
For the third type, “no amendment shall be in order except . . .,” I searched the
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rules database for instances of the word “amendment*” with a window three words
to the left and fifty words to the right. The window must also include “no$,” “shall,”
and “except.”
For each of these codings, every rule was hand-checked to ensure that the Python
script had accurately coded the rules into categories. Each of the search windows
was optimized by gradually increasing the size of the window before the program
returned considerably more non-germane resolutions (95%) than germane. Each of
the search terms was also evaluated to ensure that it was not accidentally limiting out
rules that fit the category. Final counts were obtained by analyzing the individual
document counts returned by Python by year using the R package tm.
It should be noted that the first and third types of rules—amendments con-
sidered as adopted and no amendments except—fit the theoretical profile (positive
substantive/positive procedural rules) especially cleanly. The second type of rule—
amendments considered as read—is more mixed. The strongest evidence for the
theory, then, should emerge on the most clean, “prototypical” type of rules. If we
get more mixed evidence for the usage of the second type of rule, but stronger ev-
idence for the first and third, this should be considered stronger evidence for the
theory.
The database of special rules comes from the rules identified by the Political
Institutions and Public Choice dataset (Rohde 2010), extended from 1947 to 2012.
These data code all recorded votes on rules issued by the Rules Committee, as
identified by Congressional Quarterly. I supplemented this initial coding by evaluat-
ing all recorded votes in Congressional Quarterly to determine if the recorded vote
was taken on a rule. For each of the rules identified, I obtained the full text of the
corresponding House Resolution from either the Congressional Record (through Pro-
quest Congressional, 1947-1989) or THOMAS (from 1990-2012). The total number
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of rules collected is 2,413, accounting for rules that were defeated and reintroduced
once amended.
2.4 Other Data and Methods
The measures of rules are clearly important to the operationalization of positive
and negative procedural and substantive powers. A full test of the theory, however,
requires measures of the shapes of the legislative parties and the distance between
them. For those measures, I use inflation-adjusted Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA) interest group scores (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999). The relevant
party homogeneity measures are constructed by aggregating scores by party identifi-
cation and taking the variance of those scores.8 The distance measure is constructed
by taking the absolute value of the distance of the means of the intraparty scores.9
The final measure required is a measure of policy outputs. Here, I follow Ramirez
(2013). In general, we desire a way to measure how ideological the major outputs of
the House are in any given year. To capture ideological votes, I first record all votes
designated as ideological by the ADA and the American Conservative Union (ACU).
I then record all Congressional Quarterly “key votes,” a set of the most important
votes taken by the House each year as determined by the non-partisan contributors
to that volume. Lastly, I match recorded ideological votes to the non-partisan key
votes. A key vote is counted as having an ideological direction if either of the interest
group scores recorded it as such. The final measure of policy outputs, then, is the
percent of key votes that were ideological in any given direction.10 Positive values are
8The results presented are robust to using party standard deviations, as well.
9The results presented are also broadly robust to using more general measures of polarization
(like distributional polarization, see Wood and Jordan 2011). However, the theory illuminates
separate dynamics for each of the individual components of distributional polarization, so I test
them separately here.
10Ramirez (2013) found this measure to have strong construct validity with regards to policy
movement and public demand for policy.
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more liberal, and negative values are more conservative. A value of one, for instance,
would indicate that all key votes in a given year were rated as liberal. This represents
the continuous nature of the direction of policy. Also, it allows us to measure which
of those key votes used various types of rules to achieve passage. Since the tests that
follow only test whether majority and minority party shapes are theoretically related
to lawmaking, not Republican or Democrat shapes, the output variable here also just
broadly captures ideological movement. This measure is consistent, however: in all
years, if outputs have an ideological direction, they always move in the direction of
the majority party.
The primary statistical tests take two forms. The first tests are partial adjustment
models, where the dependent variable is changes in the number of rules (of any
particular type) from the previous year. These models allow us to examine cleanly
the short-term effect of the theoretical variables—distance and respective variances—
on the year-over-year usage of types of rules. For each of those models, a general-
to-specific modeling strategy was used (De Boef and Keele 2008), eliminating lags of
the independent variables as they were insignificant. As it turns out, no lag of any
independent variable was significant, allowing us to estimate the models with only
the contemporaneous values of the independent variables.
The second tests recognize that, often, we are interested in long-run effects as
well as short-term ones. In addition, several of the variables in the system are
endogenous, as parties that change in their homogeneity also tend to move further
from one another. One modeling strategy is particularly well equipped to handle this
circumstance. Vector auto-regression, explained more fully in the next section, allows
for variables to be endogenous and allows the analyst to estimate a system with a mix
of integrated and stationary variables. VAR here would only be problematic if one
or more of the variables were cointegrated, in which case a Vector error-correction
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Table 2.2: Predicting Usage of Rule Types
Change in Change in
Use of Rules Use of Rules
in the Nature in the Nature Change in
of a Substitute of a Substitute Use of Rules for
Considered as Considered as No Amendment
Variable Adopted Read Except
Change in Yt−1 -0.384∗∗ -0.417∗∗ -0.560∗∗
(0.122) (0.114) (0.106)
Minority Variance 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Change in Majority Variance 0.005 0.002 0.012∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Change in Majority Variancet−1 - 0.007∗ -
(0.004)
Change in Distance 0.176 0.423 0.520∗
(0.170) (0.249) (0.276)
Constant -0.156 0.414 0.040
(1.274) (1.798) (2.091)
R2 0.15 0.28 0.35
N 64 64 64
AIC 5.352 6.049 6.346
BIC 87.155 133.934 150.760
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses.
LM tests for autocorrelation insignificant.
(VECM) format would be preferred. Johansen tests, however, indicate that in none
of the VARs estimated is the rank of the cointegrating vector found to be more than
zero (that is, there is no cointegration present).
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 displays the results of the three key primary models: partial adjustment
models predicting the differenced series for each type of special rule outlined above.11
11By all criteria, each of these types of rules was found to be integrated. Majority variance and
distance are also integrated; minority variance is stationary. Accordingly, the models here deal with
only minority variance in levels and all other variables in differences.
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We will examine each of these models in succession. Turn first to the first type of rule:
amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted. The partial adjust-
ment model, presented in differences, in the first column of Table 2.2, is substantively
uninteresting. The series is negatively autoregressive, meaning that increases from
the previous year lead to decreases in following years (a broadly oscillating pattern).
But nothing else matters substantively. Minority variance, differenced majority vari-
ance, and distance all do not have statistically significant effects on the first type of
rule. This seems highly unlikely: a significant amount of prior literature has found
these party shape variables to at least broadly influence types of lawmaking (such as
the CPG literature cited in Sections 1 and 2).
Instead, what seems to be happening is that the model in differences is obscuring
the effects found in levels. To uncover these effects, we need a system of estima-
tion that allows for multiple variables to exist in levels, even if they are integrated.
In addition, it might very well be that multiple variables in the model are endoge-
nous (in particular, party variances might be highly related to distance). Vector
auto-regression (VAR) is well equipped to handle such endogeneity. Unlike conven-
tional regression analysis, in which the righthand-side variables are assumed to be
exogenous (and independent), VAR analysis treats each variable in the system sym-
metrically. Through this symmetric treatment, VAR allows for two-way relationships
among the variables, includes strong controls for history, and affords the analyst the
ability to track the temporal dynamics of the relationships through time. When
executed, the variables of interest are organized as a system of equations where each
variable is regressed on multiple lagged values of itself and multiple lagged values
of the other variables in the system. The resulting inferences are made regarding
the system of variables taken as a whole. Accordingly, I recast this model as a
four-variable (rule type, minority variance, majority variance, and distance) VAR
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Table 2.3: Granger Causality: VAR for Nature Substitute Adopted
Response Variable
Nature
Shocked Substitute Majority Minority
Variable Distance Adopted Variance Variance
Distance - → →
Nature Substitute Adopted -
Majority Variance → -
Minority Variance → → -
System (All Lags Jointly) → → → →
From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at p < 0.10.
with one-year lag, as determined by likelihood ratio tests and other fit criteria. The
contemporaneous correlations between the variables are all very low, far below the
| ρ |> 0.2 standard recommended by Enders (2010, 311). Accordingly, we can feel
confident in the inferences obtained from the VAR ordered as reported. I use the
same order for each of the following VARs: distance first, followed by rule type, then
majority and minority variance.
I begin by investigating Granger causality for each of the possible relationships.
The causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed in the
columns. If the contemporary and lagged series of the shocked variable Granger cause
the response variable (they are jointly significant), the cell linking that row and col-
umn receives an arrow. The results are presented in Table 2.3. The most important
theoretical evidence is in the third column: is the usage of positive substantive rules
Granger-caused by distance and by majority variance? We receive support for the
theory on the first expectation. Distance exerts a statistically significant effect on the
usage of these types of positive substantive rules. Majority variance, however, does
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not Granger-cause the usage of rules. However, Lu¨tkepohl (2007, 48) shows that “. . .
a lack of a Granger-causal relationship from one group of variables to the remaining
variables cannot necessarily be interpreted as lack of a cause and effect relationship,”
as Granger tests do not consider dynamic feedback among variables . Therefore, we
must also consider the system of dynamic impulse responses before reaching strong
conclusions about the nature of the relationships between the variables in the system.
For that, we turn to impulse response functions.
By its nature, VAR produces a large amount of output when estimating a system.
An especially useful way to summarize this output is through impulse response func-
tions.12 Impulse response functions trace the responses to all variables in the system
to a shock in a single variable. The variable being shocked runs along the y-axis
(in rows), the variable responding along the x-axis (in columns). Accordingly, the
diagonal is the variable responding to a shock in itself. Figure 2.4 depicts the impulse
response function for the four-variable VAR described above. The matrix offers a
visual representation of how the system responds to changes in each of the endoge-
nous variables of interest. The plots show the immediate and long-term effects of
these changes and afford us the opportunity to track direct and indirect relationships
among the variables. The plots in each row show how the other variables respond
to a one-unit shock in standardized versions of the series. Confidence intervals are
12Each endogenous variable in the system can be shocked mathematically to produce a response
in the other variables in the system. The responses to these simulated shocks take into account
feedback across variables that can either suppress or accentuate the relationships. Plots of the
resulting innovations—called impulse response functions (IRFs)—allow one to observe the behavior
of the system through time. If two variables are related, a shock in one variable will cause an
observable change in the other. A feature that distinguishes VAR from other time series methods
that warrants special attention concerns the issue of whether the variables in a VAR need to be
stationary. The goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among the variables,
not determine specific parameter estimates (Enders 2004). Differencing produces no gain in asymp-
totic efficiency in an autoregression, and throws away important information. Enders (2010) notes
that the “majority view” is that the form of the variables in the VAR should mimic the true data
generating process.
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calculated for the responses. Responses are “significant” as long as these confidence
intervals do not include zero. Zero is represented by the horizontal line in each of
the plots. A response above the zero line denotes a positive effect. A response below
the zero line denotes a negative effect.
Note first that each variable responds significantly to itself (the impulse responses
along the diagonal are all positive and significant). Each of the shocks on the diagonal
also displays the characteristic rise in the immediate period followed by a mutli-period
decay to zero. Theoretically, the most interesting results are in the fourth column
which depicts responses in the rule series to shocks in the other variables in the
system.
More compelling evidence for the theory emerges from the results of majority
variance and distance. Since the impulse response functions of the full VAR may
be hard to read, I present the panels of majority variance and distance on rules
separately in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. In the case of majority variance, the theory predicts
that majority parties should use positive substantive powers more often as majority
variance decreases (for instance moving from H6a to H7a). And we observe this exact
effect in Figure 2.5. A positive shock to majority variance (making the party more
heterogenous) leads to an immediate and negative effect on the usage of positive
substantive rules. Moreover, this effect persists for multiple time periods. Figure
2.6 provides even more evidence for the theory with regards to the expectations on
distance. The theory anticipates that increasing distance leads to more partisan
policy through the use of positive substantive powers (comparing, for instance, H2c-
H5c to H6c-H9c). And again this is exactly what we observe. A positive shock to
distance increases the usage of positive substantive rules. This effect is delayed—
the shock is not felt in the first two periods, indicating that parties take a year or
two to assess the shapes of the parties before attempting to use positive substantive
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rules. But the effect is felt for multiple time periods. Increasing distance between
the parties is important for the usage of positive substantive powers.
The theory is largely supported in the above tests of positive substantive powers.
How about in the test of those rules that are a broader mix of positive substantive
and positive procedural powers? Recall that the second type of rule—amendments
considered as read—is a mix of these types. Such a rule places a substantive em-
phasis on a majority-defined substitute amendment, a clear substantive goal, but
fails to go so far as to consider that amendment as adopted, rather just as read.
Moreover, such rules assist primarily in setting the procedural agenda. The major-
ity party is exercising procedural power to place emphasis on a certain amendment
above all others, but, unlike the prior type, allows for debate and amendment to
that amendment (which would not be possible if the amendment was considered as
adopted). Accordingly, then, increases in majority variance should lead to decreases
in the usage of this type of rule (paralleling the positive substantive logic in moving
from H6a to H7a). Similarly, increases in distance should lead to increases in the
usage of this type of rule, as majority parties take advantage of its positive substan-
tive effects (like moving from H2c-H5c to H6c-H9c). New, however, is the prediction
regarding minority variance. The theory predicts that the use of positive procedural
powers should increase as minority variance decreases (like moving from H6a to H8a).
Accordingly, we should observe a negative sign on minority variance, a positive sign
on distance, and a negative sign on majority variance in the models on rules of the
second type.
The results of the partial adjustment model in differences are presented in the
second column of Table 2.2. Again, we get a negative sign on the lagged dependent
variable, indicating that year-over-year increases in the usage of this type of rule
are associated with decreases in the following year. Again, similar to the model
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on the first type of rule, much of the partial adjustment model in differences is
substantively uninteresting. Here, however, the coefficient on the lag of majority
variance is positive and significant.13 This indicates that as majorities become more
heterogenous, not homogenous, they use this type of rule. Of course, this is counter
to our theoretical expectation. But a plausible explanation exists. As the party
grows more heterogenous, a greater emphasis is placed on the procedural aspect
of this rule. Instead of serving to accomplish substantive goals, these rules serve to
reduce uncertainty on the House floor. Heterogenous majorities in particular want to
avoid conflict and challenges on the floor, both from the minority party but also from
within their own party. It is plausible, then, that majorities would use these rules
more often as they became more heterogenous. This effect is statistically significant
but substantively somewhat limited. A one standard deviation increase in majority
variance (around 125 units) results in only about a one-unit year-over-year increase in
the number of rules that consider substitutes as read. Our ability to explain changes
in the usage of this type rule is stronger than the first type as well (R2 = 0.28 relative
to R2 = 0.15 in the first model).
Similar to the previous rule, it could be that the model in differences is obscuring
important long-run effects only found in the model in levels. Accordingly, I estimate
the system as a VAR, again with one lag as determined by likelihood ratios. Recall
that the order is the same as the previous model: distance, rules, majority variance,
and minority variance. The Granger causality tests are reported in Table 2.4. Here
13This model includes the lagged value of majority variance following the advice of De Boef and
Keele (2008), arguing that unnecessary restrictions on the lag structure of independent variables
(here that all lags are zero) leads to problematic estimation. Accordingly, I tested whether any lag
structure other than immediate contemporaneous effects existed in any of the theoretical models
presented. Only in this case—majority variance and substitute amendments considered as read—
did any lag have an effect. In all other cases for all other variables, the effects of lagged differences
were statistically and substantively insignificant. I do not present those results for ease of exposition
and clarity.
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Table 2.4: Granger Causality: VAR for Nature Substitute Read
Response Variable
Nature
Shocked Substitute Majority Minority
Variable Distance Read Variance Variance
Distance - →
Nature Substitute Read -
Majority Variance → -
Minority Variance → → -
System (All Lags Jointly) → → → →
From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at p < 0.10.
again, the causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed in
the columns. Again we observe the importance of distance, as it Granger-causes the
use of rules that make amendments be considered as read. Evidence for the theory
is mixed with regards to majority variance, as it fails to Granger-cause the usage of
rules. We also observe that minority variance is important for the use of these types
of rules: a finding we will further investigate using IRFs.
The IRF from this VAR is shown in Figure 2.7. Again, the most theoretically
interesting results are in the fourth column which depicts the response of the rules
series to shocks in each of the other variables. Note first that majority variance
fails to exert a statistically significant effect on the rules series, offering a mixed
perspective on the possible alternative explanation offered above. We get even more
mixed evidence regarding the effect of minority variance. As illuminated further in
Figure 2.8, increases in minority variance (minorities becoming more heterogenous)
again lead to increases in the use of this type of rule, not the expected negative
sign. This effect, though, is small, but persists for a number of time periods. The
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long-term effect actually persists into ten time periods, indicating that changes in
party composition have real, persisting effects on lawmaking.
Again, however, we have a plausible alternative explanation. Theoretically, we
expected that homogenous minority parties should require positive procedural ma-
neuvering by the majority party, as they represent a unified opposition (groups of
like-minded legislators would vote together more easily to defeat majority propos-
als). But it could also be the case that majorities are strategic enough to exploit
heterogenous minorities. That is, majority parties know when they are facing rela-
tively heterogenous minorities. Majority parties should recognize this disunity and
take advantage of it by passing procedurally advantageous rules, knowing that they
will not be defeated. Even if the minority party does not like a rule, its own het-
erogeneity keeps it from building a coalition to defeat the rule. The analyst should
remember: the use of positive powers is costly. Party leaders usually pay that cost
on the basis of natural party unity, meaning that the shared goals of the members
of the party provide substantive and natural reason for the party to remain unified
in opposition. Delay or other minority party opposition “can be quite irksome to
some minority party members, leading to more, not less, dissention within its ranks”
(Green 2015, 120). Minority parties, especially heterogenous ones, must employ delay
judiciously. In this sense a majority party might “exploit” a heterogenous minority
by passing positive procedural rules. We will return to this point in the next set of
results.
Note that distance again is in the correct sign and direction when considering
the system in levels. The IRF of distance is isolated in Figure 2.9. The effect is
clear. A one-unit increase in the standardized distance variable leads to a strong and
persistent response in the rules series. This response persists for four time periods,
too. Our theoretical expectations, then, receive a mix of support when considering
54
the model both in differences and in levels.
We return a final time to Table 2.2. The third column presents the results for
those rules that make no amendment in order except one prescribed in the rule.
This is a cleanly positive procedural power, as the amendment advocated is not
required to have any substantive content. Rather, the rule itself is simply about
controlling the procedural agenda. Accordingly, we should expect a negative sign
on minority variance (the same logic as moving from H6a to H8a above), but no
necessary corresponding expectations for majority variance or for distance.
The results again provide mixed evidence for the theory. Even without strong
theoretical expectations, the differenced distance measure exerts a positive and sig-
nificant influence on the differenced rule series. A one-unit year-over-year increase in
distance leads to an expected 0.520-unit year-over-year increase in the usage of these
types of positive procedural rules. The largest year-to-year increases in distance are
about ten units, so the immediate effect of this increase is considerable. Note also
that the previously troubling positive coefficient on majority variance reemerges, this
time on a strictly procedural rule. This evidence indicates that the majority party
truly does use positive procedural powers to guard against both minority party chal-
lenges as well as internal challenges. This type of rule simply reduces uncertainty
on the House floor without necessarily pursuing substantive goals: we observe that
majority parties use it more often when their own members become relatively more
heterogenous. Minority party variance, the only variable with a strong theoretical
prediction, is not statistically significant in this model.
Just as with the other rules series, we can recast the system as a VAR to en-
sure that no important long-run relationships are being obscured in the model in
differences. Again, for clarification, the order of the VAR follows the same logic of
the contemporaneous correlations of the variables in the system: distance, rule type,
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Table 2.5: Granger Causality: VAR for No Amendment Except
Response Variable
No
Shocked Amendment Majority Minority
Variable Distance Except Variance Variance
Distance - →
No Amendment Except -
Majority Variance → -
Minority Variance → → -
System (All Lags Jointly) → → → →
From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at p < 0.10.
majority variance, then minority variance. The Granger causality tests are presented
in Table 2.5. Here again, the causal variable is listed in the rows and the response
variable is listed in the columns. A now familiar pattern emerges: the usage of this
type of rule is Granger-caused by both distance (theoretically expected) and minor-
ity variance (not theoretically expected). To illuminate these effects, I interpret the
IRFs from this VAR in the next paragraph.
The full IRF from a VAR with one lag is shown in Figure 2.10. As before, the
responses of the theoretically interesting variable, the rule series, are shown in the
fourth column. The IRF provides additional evidence for the importance of distance.
Just as in the other series, a shock to distance leads to a response in even these
solely procedural rules, though this effect is fairly immediate and does not persist.
Clearly, distance is important for the use of all positive powers, both procedural and
substantive.
The other theoretically emergent finding is the effect of minority variance. Recall
that we theoretically expect minority variance to exert a negative effect: majorities
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use positive procedural rules to protect themselves against more homogenous minor-
ity parties. To help elucidate this test, the isolated IRF for minority variance on the
rule series is presented in Figure 2.11. Here, we actually observe a positive effect.
This parallels the effect found in rules that consider substitutes as read. Instead of
guarding against homogenous minorities, majority parties seem to exploit minorities
that grow more heterogenous by passing positive procedural rules. This effect is
delayed, but takes a considerable amount of time to decay.
Overall, then, the theory receives mixed initial evidence. For the most important
predictions, and with the most appropriate statistical models, we get strong evidence
for the theory. Distance always behaves as expected: increasing distance leads to
the increased use of positive powers, both procedural and substantive. For the use of
positive substantive powers particularly, majority variance also behaves as expected.
Majority parties increasingly use positive substantive powers as their base becomes
more homogenous (and can increasingly agree on a single policy to pursue). The
theory receives weaker support on procedural powers. Instead of responding, as ex-
pected, to minority variance by guarding against it, majority parties seem to exploit
heterogenous minorities by using positive procedural powers. On this point, readers
should be encouraged that this is the first systematic test of a fully elaborated iter-
ation of Conditional Party Government. Future research should test more fully the
theory developed in this section (majorities shielding themselves against homoge-
nous minorities) against this plausible alternative hypothesis (majorities exploiting
heterogenous minorities).
2.6 Theory Versus Conventional Wisdom
One of the overarching criticisms offered here is that the current literature fails
to theoretically or methodologically account for important variation in the usage of
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different types of rules. In particular, it fails to differentiate between positive and
negative rules that accomplish either procedural or substantive goals. In the previous
section we illuminated the contrasting theoretical dynamics among the usage of three
different types of rules. It would be interesting, then, to compare these theoretical
findings with the conventional wisdom on rules to display the importance of the
theory.
According to the conventional wisdom, I collapse all of the rules together. That
is, the dependent variable is simply the collection of all rules, regardless of their
content, issued within a given year. As this variable is also integrated, the analysis
that follows is a partial adjustment model on the dependent variable in differences. I
include the three key theoretical predictors from above—majority variance, minority
variance, and distance—as well as a dummy variable for Republican control of the
House. This variable is interacted with distance following the conventional wisdom
that Republicans are inherently more prone to issuing special rules than Democrats as
distance increases, due to ideological factions like the Tea Party. Other conventional
controls, like a dummy for the first session, or theoretical controls, like majority
size and minority size (from Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger [2007]) were found to be
insignificant.14 The results are presented in Table 2.6.
None of the theoretical findings from the previous section is reflected in the
conventional wisdom model. Minority variance, changes in majority variance, and
changes in distance (for Democrats) are all found to be unrelated to year-over-year
changes in the usage of broad rules. This is extraordinarily important. The three
most important variables to the theory—and the three most important variables to
the nature of conflict between the parties—are wholly unrelated to the broad is-
14It is important to note that they were also insignificant in the theoretical models presented in
Table 2.2. These models are not presented due to space concerns, but they are available from the
author.
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Table 2.6: Conventional Rules Wisdom
Variable Change in
All Rules Total
Change in Yt−1 -0.444∗∗
(0.121)
Minority Variance -0.003
(0.014)
Change in Majority Variance 0.005
(0.016)
Change in Distance 0.703
(0.673)
Republican Control -2.787
(4.227)
Republican Control∗ Change in Distance 2.584
(1.860)
Constant 1.842
(5.178)
R2 0.28
N 64
AIC 8.119
BIC 268.553
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses.
LM tests for autocorrelation insignificant.
suance of rules to accomplish legislative ends. Put another way, when we treat all
rules as equivalent in procedure and substance, we find that polarization (the parties
separating or growing more homogenous) is totally unrelated to lawmaking. Clearly,
the more nuanced portrait provided in the theory and its tests above are warranted.
The lone exception is that the (atheoretical) interaction between Republican con-
trol and changes in distance comes close to statistical significance. The marginal
effects of that interaction, then, are investigated further in Table 2.7.15 We already
15Of course, conditionality implies that if the effect of changes in distance is conditional on party
control, so too is the effect of party control conditional on distance (Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2006). However, those effects were not statistically or substantively significant for any realistic
sample value for changes in distance (like year-over-year increases in distance of over ten points, or
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Table 2.7: Marginal Effect of Changes in Distance
Value Marginal Effect Standard Error p Value
Republican Control = 0 0.703 (0.673) 0.297
Republican Control = 1 3.286 (1.888) 0.082∗
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
know that the marginal effect of changes in distance for Democrats is insignificant
(the coefficient on distance in the model). The coefficient on changes in distance
for Republicans, however, is significant at p = 0.08. This model informs us that
year-over-year increases in distance only lead to increases in the use of all rules
when Republicans are in control of the House. As much as this finding pairs nicely
with journalistic wisdom on the vilification of the Republican party and government
shutdowns, it is not theoretically informed. The theoretically motivated findings
concerning the different types of rules separately, however, show the opposite. Re-
gardless of party control, majority variance and distance affect the usage of rules in
systematic ways. Moreover, those effects depend on whether the rule in question is
procedural or substantive in nature. It is imperative to account for these theoretical
distinctions or we might be led astray by the types of results illustrated in Table 2.6.
2.7 Changes in Policy
The final theory tests in this section concern the directional movement of policy.
(The policy extremism series itself is presented in Figure 2.12.) Recall that higher
values in this series indicate a higher percentage of key votes (Congressional output)
that is classified as ideological (in either direction). That is, does the usage of certain
types of rules lead to the creation of more extreme policy? The results of that model
are presented in Table 2.8. As the policy movement is stationary, the model is run
10% of the entire scale of the variable).
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Table 2.8: Changes in Policy
Variable Interest Scores
Yt−1 0.243∗
(-0.137)
Minority Variance -0.000
(0.000)
Change in Majority Variance 0.000
(0.000)
Change in Distance 0.010
(0.011)
Republican Control -0.028
(0.062)
Change in Majority Size 0.005
(0.003)
Change in Minority Size 0.007∗
(0.003)
Change in Substitute Adopted 0.020∗∗
(0.009)
Change in Substitute Read -0.014∗
(0.007)
Change in No Amendment Except -0.007
(0.006)
Constant 0.280∗∗
(0.092)
R2 0.22
N 65
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses.
LM tests for autocorrelation insignificant.
in levels, rather than differences. The theory implies two direct predictions. First,
policy should become more ideological as majority party homogeneity increases. Sec-
ond, policy should become more ideological as distance increases. The theory, as well
as the empirical results above, also imply an indirect prediction. As the majority
party uses positive procedural rules, such as rules that consider amendments in the
nature of a substitute as adopted, we should observe more ideological policy.
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Figure 2.12: Policy Extremism Time Series.
The empirical results only partially support these predictions. With regards to
distance and majority party homogeneity, we observe null effects for both variables.
Interestingly, changes in distance between the parties seem unrelated to the level of
ideological policy in any given year. We do, however, observe the expected positive
coefficient on positive substantive rules. A one-unit increase in the year-to-year
change in the number of rules in which a substitute amendment is considered as
adopted leads to a total (long-run effect included) effect of increasing ideological
policy extremism by 3% (as the scale of the policy variable is 0 [no ideological policy]
to 1 [all ideological policy]). This indicates that simply using only three more of these
types of rules over the prior year is enough to increase ideological policy by almost
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10%. The effect of this substantive lawmaking strategy is substantively significant.
Again, we might have general concerns that the model with differences could
be missing long-run dynamics only present in levels. Accordingly, the system was
cast as a VAR. Since the time series are short, however, not enough degrees of free-
dom are available to estimate the whole model as shown in Table 2.8. Accordingly,
the seven-variable system includes the policy variable, minority variance, majority
variance, distance, Republican control, majority size, minority size, and the positive
substantive rule (amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted),
as these are the most theoretically important variables and the most theoretically
important type of rules. Again, fit statistics indicate that a lag length one is ap-
propriate for the model. In addition, Johansen tests again indicate that there is
no cointegration present. Lastly, the same analysis of contemporaneous correlations
was done for each of the pairs of series in the model to determine the order of the
system. Distance retains its importance, so it is entered first so as to allow it to
contemporaneously affect all of the other variables in the system. Rule type is sec-
ond, followed by policy outputs, then majority variance and minority variance, and
finally majority size and minority size. The system is fairly robust to specification
of the final four variables, but the order for distance, rule type, and policy is impor-
tant (as it theoretically should be: distance, rules, and policy jointly comprise the
bulk of lawmaking). Republican control of the House of Representatives is entered
deterministically.
The IRF for the entire system is not presented, as a seven-by-seven panel tests
the limits of usefulness in interpretation. Instead, Granger causality tests are shown
in Table 2.9. As a reminder, Granger causality tests indicate whether a variable and
its lags are jointly significant in determining another variable in a VAR system. In
Table 2.9, the causal variable is listed in the rows and the response variable is listed
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Table 2.9: Granger Causality: VAR for Policy Outputs
Response Variable
Nature
Shocked Maj. Min. Substitute Maj. Min.
Variable Policy Var. Var. Distance Adopted Size Size
Policy - → →
Majority Variance - → →
Minority Variance - →
Distance - →
NSA -
Majority Size - →
Minority Size → → → → -
From VAR with one lag (chosen by fit criteria).
Johansen test indicates no cointegration.
Causality denoted at p < 0.10.
in the columns. A few general words are in order, however. The effects of distance
and majority variance, though they have the correct sign (positive and negative,
respectively), are insignificant in the impulse response function on the policy measure
(not shown) and fail to Granger cause the policy variable. Interestingly, we get more
confirmatory evidence for the general theory presented in this section. Echoing the
theoretical findings in the previous models, distance is shown to Granger cause rules
in the nature of a substitute as adopted in this expanded model.
A final word is in order concerning the substantive effect of the rules series on
the policy variable. Even though the effect of rules on policy extremism is not
Granger-causal, recall the prior admonition from Lu¨tkepohl (2007, 48), forcing us to
examine the IRFs more carefully before drawing inferences about a cause-and-effect
relationship. Broadly reflecting the findings from the partial adjustment models, we
again see a positive and significant effect for the use of positive substantive powers
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increasing policy extremism through the impulse response function shown in Figure
2.13. The effect is delayed, but persists for multiple time periods once felt. The use
of these most restrictive types of rules has a clear impact on overall policy. Again,
this is the first theoretical insight that we have on the systematic nature of these
effects.
2.8 Conclusion
This section has covered a lot of ground. The elaborated theory of lawmaking
was introduced. We made general predictions for the types of powers, both proce-
dural and substantive, that should be observed given different compositions of the
parties and the distance between them. We uncovered new evidence for that theory,
primarily based on new empirical data measuring the usage of different types of rules
over time. And we contrasted that evidence in particular to the conventional wisdom
surrounding the usage of rules.
The evidence is strongest for positive substantive powers. The usage of these
rules is clearly related to the distance between the parties as well as the homogeneity
of the majority party, both of which are predicted by the theory. Moreover, these
types of powers are directly related to increasing policy extremism, also predicted
by the theory. For the most important types of rules, creating the most important
types of legislation, the theory receives the strongest support.
It is worth dwelling on the latter point. The analyses presented here also illustrate
the potential dangers of continuing to analyze the usage of rules without regard for
their specific substantive or procedural content. If we treat all rules equivalently,
we find evidence for journalistic accounts of Congress: Republican extremity in the
usage of rules with little theoretical or strategic motivation. Moreover, we find no
evidence of a compelling theoretical story for variables that should be consistently
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significant: majority variance, minority variance, and distance. Only when we regard
each series separately does a theoretically informed account emerge. The usage of
different types of rules responds to different theoretical elements. And only the most
restrictive types of rules—those positive substantive rules that consider amendments
as adopted—have real effects on the nature of policy extremism.
The evidence is more mixed for positive procedural powers. The usage of these
powers is still substantially related to the distance between the two parties, not nec-
essarily predicted by (but not inconsistent with) the theory presented here. We did
find, however, contradictory evidence for how positive procedural powers related to
minority party homogeneity. Rather than shielding itself from increasingly homoge-
nous minority parties, the majority party seems to exploit heterogenous minorities
more often by passing more procedural types of rules. Further evidence is certainly
needed on this point. It is imperative to keep in mind that this is the first lon-
gitudinal test of the elaborated theory of lawmaking. While its central (and most
theoretically and substantively important) predictions are supported, there are sev-
eral opportunities to refine the theory and its predictions in future analyses. A variety
of potentially competing explanations for this unanticipated finding exist. Most im-
portantly, we now have both the empirical data required to test those explanations
and a theoretical foothold in which to ground new expectations.
We also have empirical evidence for an idea that analysts have long suspected
but have been unable to demonstrate: rules are not created equally. Parties use
rules differently in changing circumstances; moreover, that changing usage responds
systematically to predictable theoretical conditions. Our understanding of the law-
making process is inherently limited if we fail to take the differences in types of rules
to account. While it is true that some of the above analyses have generated more
theoretical questions than they have answered, it is important to remember that,
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without analyzing these series separately, we would not know which questions to ask
in the first place.
Having tested the core of the theoretical expectations in this section, the next
two sections test secondary predictions of the theory. Specifically, if lawmaking varies
systematically with the shapes of the parties and the distance between them, what
does this mean for representation? And if lawmaking becomes more procedural
through the use of different types of (unpopular) rules, what does this mean for
approval? We turn to these questions in the next sections.
70
3. RESTRICTIVE RULES AND REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES
The previous section illuminates many of the changing patterns of lawmaking
as polarization, specifically through changing the “condition” of Conditional Party
Government, changes the types of laws made and the types of rules used to make
those laws. Observing these changes, a logical question is how this new type of
lawmaking impacts the quality of representation received by the mass public?
Of course, we know quite a bit already about the quality of representation in
the United States. At the dyadic level (Member of Congress to constituency, such
as Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002), across different issues (Miller and Stokes
1963; Hurley and Hill 2003), and in the aggregate (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson
1995), representation exists in some form or another. Representation may be better
on some issues than others (Hill and Hurley 1999), to some constituencies than others
(Griffin and Newman 2005), or may take a lagged functional form (Wlezien 1995),
but it is largely found to exist.
One such path for these effects is through lawmaking. The resurgence of polar-
ization has led to a broad growth in the use of restrictive rules in passing major
legislation (Duff and Rohde 2012). The use of these rules could have the clear effect
of increasing representation for some partisan subgroups over others.
This section aims to answer this question. In particular, I use novel data on rules
and polarization to investigate how patterns of representation change with polariza-
tion. On the upside, polarization does not seem to preclude the representation of
any particular partisan group, including Independents. Though the quality of that
representation may decline, the general pattern of representation still seems to exist.
However, it is apparent that the use of rules is not unbiased. For Republicans in
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particular, restrictive rules help to shift policy outcomes toward Republican policy
demands, often at the expense of others.
3.1 Literature Review and Theory
Representation can arise in a variety of ways, and the quality of that emergent
representation can vary significantly. Political science, working at least since the
seminal cross-sectional work of Miller and Stokes (1963), has provided a wide variety
of evidence for policy representation by the United States House of Representatives.
Most important for the analysis at hand is that this representation is often un-
equal. Most notably, representation often skews towards co-partisans (Hurley and
Hill 2003). Adams, Bishin, and Dow (2004, 348) find that voters prefer and elec-
torally reward when candidates present non-centrist positions on issues, though there
is some concern that too much ideological extremity (in the view of the district) can
hurt Members (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002).
While we have evidence that representation exists at the dynamic, global level,
between broadly aggregated public preferences and broadly considered government
policy outputs (for instance Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002), we have little
research on how this process has changed as the political environment has changed.
Most notably, it is easiest to represent public opinion when most members of the
public aggregate to a single, well defined policy preference, and most Members can
compromise to create policy that reflects that interest. Recall: only a single policy
is created for all individuals. Both of those realities, however, have shifted dra-
matically. Individuals in the mass public are possibly becoming more ideologically
extreme on the basis of party identification (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). At the
very least, they are becoming more consistent in their policy preferences on the basis
of their party identification (Levendusky 2009). Accordingly, it is more disingenu-
72
ous to aggregate over all of their preferences and establish a single, representative
policy average to be represented in the traditional dynamic, demand-input model.
Instead, we have multiple, separate subgroups demanding increasingly different types
of policy, often mutually exclusive. Our tests of the quality of representation should
reflect these differences, especially if we know that dyadic representation often skews
towards co-partisans.
Politicians are also becoming more ideologically extreme. Across any given mea-
sure, Members of Congress are growing more divided on the basis of party identi-
fication (Fleisher and Bond 2004). This exacerbates the problem of representation.
Not only is it harder to establish the aggregate public position to be represented, but
politicians themselves are less likely to compromise to represent such an aggregate
position, even if it existed. Instead, they are more likely to demand extreme positions
and extreme policy alternatives, possibly hurting the quality of representation.
The previous section illuminated some of these potential problems. Changing
shapes of parties led to certain, more substantive rules being used to pass legislation.
And those positive substantive rules move policy toward the policy preferences of the
majority party in Congress, not towards the preferences of the public. As these rules
are used more, party control of the institution during polarized time periods might
fundamentally shift policy outcomes away from the floor median, as parties use rules
and other leadership powers to pursue firmly partisan legislation. Yet even despite
the preponderance of evidence demonstrating changing methods of lawmaking, we
have little evidence on how these new patterns of lawmaking affect representation
over time. Even though we are fairly certain of changing elite and mass polarization,
we haven’t yet tested their effects on representation.
Only a single study attempts to disentangle these potential effects. Ura and
Ellis (2012) attempt to measure policy preferences by partisan subgroup explicitly,
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jettisoning the idea of a single aggregate preference to be represented globally. They
find that each of the partisan moods—Republican, Democratic, and Independent—is
responsive to macro conditions (like the economy). The main difference between the
parties is their responses to policy choices despite parallel responses to conditions.
Partisan subgroups perceive policy alternatives differently, and they adjust their
preferences in non-identical ways when evaluating those policies.
The patterns described above have logical implications for the quality of repre-
sentation that could emerge as polarization increases. Two ideas are immediately
apparent. First, policy could potentially shift from being representative to aggregate
policy preferences (of the whole public in the average) to being more representative
of specific partisan preferences. As polarization increases, more issues might be-
come party defining, leading to an electoral benefit of representation of co-partisans
over the mass public or better representation on the basis of broader belief-sharing.
No matter the mechanism, representatives might become more responsive to their
co-partisans as polarization increases.
Second, a main driver of that process should be the increasingly partisan use of
rules, especially restrictive ones on major legislation, as a normal pattern of law-
making. On this point, Conditional Party Government is clear. As the “condition”
of CPG becomes more satisfied, meaning, broadly, that as the parties become more
polarized, the majority party is increasingly empowered to use restrictive rules to
accomplish party goals. In light of the first theoretical expectation, these rules could
be used to increasingly represent the policy preferences of co-partisans over parti-
sans. The above discussion implies that these effects might be conditional on one
another. That is, the use of rules might be exclusively devoted to representing co-
partisan mood. As preferences shift to become more extreme, rules might be used
to represent those changes in preferences. Generally, then, we are left with three
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theoretical expectations.
H12: The higher the level of polarization, the better the representation
of the mass co-partisans of the party that controls the House.
H13: As polarization increases, restrictive rules should increasingly be used
to shift policy outputs towards the preferences of the mass co-partisans of the
party that controls the House.
H14: As polarization increases, restrictive rules should especially be used to shift
policy outputs towards the preferences of the party that controls the House as
its co-partisan, mass preferences grow to be more extreme in the direction
of the majority party (Democrats becoming more liberal and Republicans more
conservative). That is, the representational benefit of restrictive rules is
conditional on mass policy preferences moving to become more extreme.
Of course, previous sections speak to the theoretical predictions here. For in-
stance, the theory laid out in Section 2 (and tested there) demonstrates how the
usage of the most restrictive types of rules increases with the specific purpose of
passing partisan legislation as elite polarization increases. This is already indirect
support for H13: as elite polarization increases, the usage of rules specifically moves
policy toward the preferences of the majority party. The theoretical predictions and
empirical tests in this section test whether that linkage emerges explicitly: whether
or not there is a direct linkage between the policy preferences of mass co-partisans
of the majority party and policy outputs.
The analyses presented here are a first cut at examining these potential rela-
tionships. What follows makes use of the data and time periods available, which,
unfortunately, are quite limited. In addition, the specifications of the models that
follow are limited by the availability of the data. I encourage discussion and ideas
on all of these points. I turn to a description of that data in the next section.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Rules over Time.
3.2 Data and Methods
The theory above suggests three key data series are required to test these ex-
pectations. The first is a measure of the use of rules over time. The database of
special rules comes from the rules identified by the Political Institutions and Public
Choice dataset (Rohde 2010), extended from 1947 to 2012. These data are described
previously in Section 2. The series is shown in Figure 3.1.
Of course, the evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that certain types of
rules are more important for policy goals than others. Accordingly, I mirror these
same analyses using the most positive, substantive type of rule discussed in Section 2:
rules that make amendments in the nature of a substitute considered as adopted. The
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Figure 3.2: House Polarization over Time.
results look identical, both presenting largely null findings. To keep from presenting
too many results, I only consider the VAR with all rules (the results are similar when
considering the positive substantive rules, too).
The measure of polarization comes from Wood and Jordan (2011). In particular,
the data use inflation-adjusted ADA scores to simulate distributions of Republicans
and Democrats in the House over time. The measure of polarization is the amount of
overlap between the two distributions. It ranges from zero (complete overlap) to one
(no distributional overlap). This measure has been found to be robust to alternative
measures of ideology and broadly consistent with other measures of polarization.
The series is presented in Figure 3.2.
The measure of policy is from Ramirez (2013). In general, we desire a way to
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measure how ideological the major outputs of the House are in any given year. To
capture ideological votes, I first record all votes designated as ideological by the
ADA and the American Conservative Union (ACU). I then record all Congressional
Quarterly “key votes,” a set of the most important votes taken by the House each
year as determined by the non-partisan contributors to that volume. Lastly, I match
recorded ideological votes to the non-partisan key votes. A key vote is counted as
having an ideological direction if either of the interest group scores recorded it as
such. The final measure of policy outputs, then, is the percent of key votes that
were ideological in any given direction.1 This represents the continuous nature of
the direction of policy. The series is shown in Figure 3.3.
We also need a measure of preferences. The preferences of partisan subgroups
are from Ura and Ellis (2012). In particular, they collect policy preferences on
Mood -like indicators from the General Social Survey and then disaggregate them by
party identification. For information on the validation of those measures, as well as
their general movements, see Ura and Ellis (2012). As they use GSS data, those
series begin in 1972 and continue through 2008. Like I do, they use WCALC to
smooth the data and to generate preference measures in off-survey years, as the GSS
is fielded irregularly.2 The measure of “full” policy preferences is the classic Mood
from Stimson (1999), updated through 2014. It takes survey marginals from a variety
of different policy questions and aggregates them via a dyadic ratios algorithm. On
all of the series, higher values indicate more liberal preferences. Each of these series
is shown together in Figure 3.4.
I also control for Republican control of the House in some of the following analyses.
1Ramirez (2013) found this measure to have strong construct validity with regards to policy
movement and public demand for policy.
2This approach has been used several times to investigate “sub-group” mood, for instance the
mood of informed groups over others (Enns and Kellstedt 2008).
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Figure 3.3: Policy Series from Ramirez (2013).
None of the hypotheses presented in this section directly implies that policy should
move to be more or less conservative or liberal when the House is controlled by
Democrats or Republicans. Yet the theory in Section 2 gives us some direction.
Recall that the majority party is thought to exercise perfect negative power, meaning
that it will never be defeated (in any real sense) on the House floor. Even if CPG is
low, meaning that majority parties should not be pursuing partisan policies, policy
should at least broadly reflect the party in power. However, this linkage is not
explicit. Accordingly, I also present models omitting the Republican control variable.
Lastly, this analysis controls for economic expectations over time. Generally, as
the economy improves, individuals hold more liberal policy preferences. Accordingly,
I control for economic perceptions with the Index of Consumer Sentiment.
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Figure 3.4: Moods, from Ura and Ellis (2012) and Stimson (1999, 2014).
Each of the moods is integrated. Policy is stationary over time. Consumer
sentiment is also integrated over time. Accordingly, this analysis makes use of two
types of modeling strategies. Partial Adjustment Models are used to model policy
in levels, with moods in differences. That is, lagged changes in mood are thought to
move policy up or down to absolute levels. To ensure that changes in differences are
not obscuring important effects found in levels, each of these analyses is also recast
as a six-variable Vector Autoregression (VAR) system. Each system contains one lag
of the variables in the system, as suggested by virtually all fit criteria (AIC, BIC,
and LR). Johansen tests for cointegration suggest that the variables in the system
are not cointegrated.
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3.3 Results
I start by reporting the results of the Partial Adjustment Models. Recall here that
the dependent variable—policy—is preserved in levels, while the key integrated inde-
pendent variables—rules and moods—are measured in differences. For each group,
we test two models. The first model is constituted of the same six variables in the
VAR. The second model interacts mood and rules for each partisan group. According
to the theory, the effect of rules on policy should be conditional on movements in
partisan mood. Only when moods change do rules affect policy movements.
Table 3.1 presents the first set of results, this time for the full mood series.
The pattern of effects in Table 3.1, Model 1 can be quickly summarized, as they
are mostly insignificant. Changes in rules, changes in sentiment, changes in House
polarization, and, most importantly, changes in mood are all insignificant on the
liberalness or conservativeness of policy outputs. Only Republican control of the
House is significant (which lends the model some validity). When Republicans are in
control of the House, it leads to an immediate 0.376-unit decrease in the liberalness
of policy outputs. Considering the scale of the policy variable—it ranges from -
1 (perfectly conservative policy) to 1 (perfectly liberal policy)—this effect is quite
large. Note that we do get evidence of a sort for H12, as changes in polarization do
not enhance representation of the full constituency.
The interactive model in Model 2 is substantively uninteresting. Most impor-
tantly, the interaction is insignificant (and the estimated effect itself is close to zero).
The effects of changes in rules are not conditional on changes in full mood. Recall,
though, that the theory is specifically about partisan subgroups. So such a null
finding is not necessarily unexpected.
Null findings persist if we examine only positive substantive rules rather than all
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Table 3.1: Full Mood and Policy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Yt−1 0.180 0.196 0.145 0.192 0.204 0.264
(0.168) (0.201) (0.181) (0.183) (0.198) (0.195)
∆All Rules 0.001 0.001 - - - -
(0.003) (0.004)
∆Nature/Adopted - - -0.006 -0.011 -0.009 -0.017
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
∆Consumer 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
Sentiment (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Republican Control -0.376∗∗ -0.367∗∗ -0.370∗∗ -0.328∗∗ - -
(0.129) (0.142) (0.130) (0.133)
∆House 0.675 0.688 0.774 1.027 1.519 1.770
Polarization (1.469) (1.495) (1.444) (1.445) (1.571) (1.524)
∆Full Moodt−1 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.018 0.036 0.020
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
∆Full Moodt−1* - 0.000 - - - -
∆All Rules (0.003)
∆Full Moodt−1* - - - 0.016 - 0.023∗
∆Nature/Adopted (0.012) (0.013)
Constant 0.156∗ 0.153∗ 0.156∗ 0.123 0.009 -0.016∗
(0.082) (0.087) (0.082) (0.086) (0.071) (0.069)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.11 0.19
N 38 38 38 38 38 38
AIC 1.026 1.078 1.027 1.080 1.207 1.212
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
rules. Again Republican control is significant in Models 3 and 4, and the estimated
effect is almost identical. The interaction between changes in full mood and rules is
stronger, but still insignificant.
If we exclude the somewhat atheoretical Republican control variable, two things
happen. First, our explanatory power drops significantly, as the R2 declines from 0.33
to 0.19 in the interactive model. Second, however, the interaction between changes in
positive substantive rules and changes in mood becomes positive and significant. The
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Figure 3.5: Marginal Effects of Changes in Nature/Adopted at Levels of Changes in
Full Mood.
marginal effect of that interaction is presented in Figure 3.5. If mood is not changing
(0 on the x-axis), then year-over-year increases in positive substantive rules have no
effect on changes in policy. However, if full mood changes, positive substantive rules
help to move policy in the direction of the change in mood. In general, then, there
is some evidence of representation to the full constituency.
Recall, however, that the general pattern in Table 3.1 was of null findings. These
null findings also persist across some partisan subgroups. The theoretical expec-
tations presented above do not necessarily suggest a test of each partisan subgroup
separately, but examining them helps to illuminate some interesting ancillary results.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for Democratic and Independent mood can be summarized to-
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Table 3.2: Democrat Mood and Policy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Yt−1 0.093 0.088 0.061 0.119 0.131 0.214
(0.183) (0.203) (0.197) (0.211) (0.209) (0.218)
∆All Rules 0.001 0.001 - - - -
(0.004) (0.004)
∆Nature/Adopted - - -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 -0.014
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
∆Consumer 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
Sentiment (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Republican Control -0.328∗∗ -0.332∗∗ -0.326∗∗ -0.299∗ - -
(0.141) (0.156) (0.141) (0.146)
∆House 0.586 0.581 0.635 0.740 1.077 1.184
Polarization (1.528) (1.559) (1.510) (1.525) (1.610) (1.597)
∆Democrat Moodt−1 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.005 0.018 0.007
(0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055)
∆Democrat Moodt−1* - 0.000 - - - -
∆All Rules (0.004)
∆Democrat Moodt−1* - - - 0.013 - 0.021
∆Nature/Adopted (0.016) (0.017)
Constant 0.131 0.133 0.132 0.107 0.009 -0.015
(0.087) (0.094) (0.087) (0.093) (0.074) (0.076)
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.06 0.11
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 1.093 1.211 1.091 1.184 1.213 1.275
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
gether. Changes in rules, regardless of how they are measured and regardless of the
inclusion of the Republican control variable, never exert a significant, unconditional
effect on changes in policy. In neither partisan case are shifts in rules conditional on
shifts in mood (Models 2, 4, and 6 in both Tables have insignificant interactions).
Moreover, in neither case are shifts in mood independently significant, as evidenced
by the null findings in Models 1, 3, and 5 of both Tables. Just as in the models
for the full mood series in Table 3.1, the only significant force on levels of policy is
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Table 3.3: Independent Mood and Policy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Yt−1 0.092 0.097 0.065 0.123 0.134 0.214
(0.182) (0.187) (0.199) (0.212) (0.211) (0.221)
∆All Rules 0.001 0.001 - - - -
(0.004) (0.004)
∆Nature/Adopted - - -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
∆Consumer 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004
Sentiment (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Republican Control -0.330∗∗ -0.327∗∗ -0.328∗∗ -0.305∗∗ - -
(0.141) (0.144) (0.141) (0.145)
∆House 0.620 0.647 0.672 0.730 1.136 1.175
Polarization (-1.522) (1.555) (1.504) (1.516) (1.604) (1.594)
∆Independent Moodt−1 -0.010 -0.016 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011
(0.037) (-0.046) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
∆Independent Moodt−1* - 0.001 - - - -
∆All Rules (-0.002)
∆Independent Moodt−1* - - - 0.020 - 0.030
∆Nature/Adopted (0.025) (0.026)
Constant 0.134 0.135 0.135 0.110 0.011 -0.013
(0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.093) (0.074) (0.076)
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.05 0.10
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 1.091 1.148 1.091 1.184 1.216 1.283
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
Republican control of the House. The size of the effects for this variable is consistent
with the findings for full mood, too.
We lastly turn to the effects of Republican mood on policy. The findings are
presented in Table 3.4. The findings across all of the models largely echo those for
Democrats and Independents: the only significant influence on policy is Republican
control of the House. Changes in rules, regardless of how they are measured, and
changes in Republican mood do not exert significant effects on changes in policy.
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Table 3.4: Republican Mood and Policy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Yt−1 0.104 -0.078 0.072 0.038 0.143 0.144
(0.182) (0.200) (0.197) (0.216) (0.209) (0.227)
∆All Rules 0.001 -0.001 - - - -
(0.004) (0.004)
∆Nature/Adopted - - -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.005
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
∆Consumer 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
Sentiment (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Republican Control -0.323∗∗ -0.356∗∗ -0.321∗∗ -0.333∗∗ - -
(0.140) (0.135) (0.140) (0.145)
∆House 0.542 0.589 0.631 0.529 1.076 1.080
Polarization (1.512) (1.450) (1.495) (1.537) (1.591) (1.635)
∆Republican Moodt−1 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.022 0.029 0.029
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
∆Republican Moodt−1* - -0.005∗ - - - -
∆All Rules (0.003)
∆Republican Moodt−1* - - - -0.012 - 0.000
∆Nature/Adopted (0.028) (0.029)
Constant 0.131 0.125 0.132 0.132 0.011 0.011
(0.086) (0.082) (0.086) (0.088) (0.073) (0.076)
R2 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.07 0.07
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 1.076 1.071 1.078 1.189 1.197 1.315
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
The interactive model, however, is more interesting for Republicans, but only for
the measure of all rules, not just those most positive and substantive (Model 2).
Namely, the interaction between changes in rules and changes in mood is significant
for changes in policy. This significant interaction appears to provides empirical sup-
port for the theory, but the coefficients alone in Table 3.4 do not fully portray the
underlying changes. To appreciate the substantive nature of the interaction, we need
to plot these effects as well.
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Figure 3.6: Marginal Effects of Changes in Rules at Levels of Changes in Republican
Mood.
To talk in any meaningful way about the magnitude of those effects, it is impor-
tant to consider marginal effects plots, as the coefficients in the model are conditional
and not interpretable in any theoretically meaningful way (Brambor, Clark, and
Golder 2006). The marginal effects of changes in rules at different levels of changes
in Republican mood are demonstrated in Figure 3.6.
The pattern observed is interesting. When Republican mood shifts to become
more conservative, the effect of increasing the number of rules used is to make policy
more liberal, not conservative. Rules, then, seem to be accomplishing the opposite of
a representational benefit. Instead, rules make it more likely to observe the opposite
of the policy preferences that the party holds.
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Figure 3.7: Mass Co-partisan Mood.
Yet it could be that we are failing to capture the appropriate measure of pref-
erences. The theory directly implies that responsiveness should increase to mass
co-partisans over time, not to one specific partisan group over another. It is possible
to capture that linkage in the above models by interacting each of the separate par-
tisan moods with the control of the institution, but such an approach is inefficient
and obscures interpretation of the coefficients. Instead, I create a new series, co-
partisan mood. This series is Democratic mood when Democrats control the House
and Republican mood when Republicans control the House. As is expected, it is
more liberal in the former years (higher positive values) and more conservative in
the latter. Co-partisan mood is presented in Figure 3.7
Table 3.5 presents the same models, using co-partisan mood as the key indepen-
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Table 3.5: Co-partisan Mood and Policy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Yt−1 0.147 0.131 0.060 0.061 0.126 0.128
(0.236) (0.235) (0.197) (0.198) (0.208) (0.210)
∆All Rules 0.001 -0.001 - - - -
(0.004) (0.004)
∆Nature/Adopted - -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.007
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
∆Consumer 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006
Sentiment (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Republican Control -0.289∗∗ -0.292∗∗ -0.320∗∗ -0.325∗∗ - -
(0.152) (0.151) (0.145) (0.147)
∆House 0.827 0.913 0.633 0.646 0.970 0.986
Polarization (1.504) (1.498) (1.513) (1.524) (1.606) (1.623)
∆Copartisan Mood 0.015 -0.031 0.005 -0.008 0.018 0.007
(0.026) (0.048) (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.030)
∆Copartisan Mood* - 0.001 - - - -
∆All Rules (0.001)
∆Copartisan Mood* - - - -0.002 - -0.002
∆Nature/Adopted (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.108 0.113 0.131 0.117 0.009 -0.006
(0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.091) (0.073) (0.08)
R2 0.22 0.25 0.210 0.230 0.070 0.080
N 34 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 1.055 1.125 1.092 1.186 1.198 1.301
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
dent variable. In the basic, non-interactive specifications (Models 1, 3, and 5), our
inferences are fundamentally the same as when we look at partisan groups separately.
(Note that the mood variable is not lagged: I assume that elites represent party
shifts in control of the House [when Republicans take control from Democrats and
vice versa] in the same time period.) Republican control of the House has a negative
and significant effect on the tenor of policy outputs, making them more conservative.
Changes in co-partisan mood seem to have no direct effect. And changes in rules,
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Figure 3.8: Marginal Effects of Changes in Rules at Levels of Changes in Co-partisan
Mood.
regardless of the measure, do not have an effect on changes in policy.
The interactive specification in Model 2 of Table 3.5 seems, at first, to also be
uninteresting. Republican control is still negative and significant, mood is still in-
significant, and the interactive specification is insignificant. The interaction, however,
is in the correct direction, and is close to statistical significance. To give the reader
an idea of the estimated effects, I present the marginal effect in Figure 3.8. When co-
partisan mood shifts to become more conservative, increases in the number of rules
used have a negative effect on policy outputs: making policy more conservative. As
co-partisan mood stays constant (zero change), rules do not have an effect on policy
outputs. And as co-partisan mood becomes more liberal, rules have a positive effect
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on policy outputs. These estimated effects overlap with zero (and with one another),
making them insignificant. But the overlap is narrow, suggesting that, as we would
expect, more data and a longer time series could uncover support for the theoretical
predictions offered.
There are a number of caveats to the above analyses. First, and foremost, we are
dealing with a severe problem in the number of degrees of freedom. These effects
may be hard to identify because there is not enough information in the model to
estimate them consistently. Second, it could be that there isn’t enough variation in
the theoretical variables to test the theory adequately. We have only observed twenty
years of increased polarization, and many of those years were exclusively under one
party’s control. This also lends criticism to the use of the Republican control dummy
variable without an explicit theoretical accounting. Until we observe a fuller mix of
Republican and Democratic control in a polarized time period, the dummy variable
risks soaking up the effects of polarization generally, rather than Republican control
specifically. In order to fully test the theory, we need more variation in both party
control of the House and partisan moods. The information available is severely
limited.
Third, the pattern of effects could be conditional on more than just partisan
mood and the number of rules. Namely, control of the House might play a large role
in the representational benefit of partisan moods. I do not insert such an interaction
here, however. The model is already difficult to identify, given the small number of
observations. Theoretical model specification is a clear opportunity for future work.
The lack of representational linkages above might be disconcerting. In partic-
ular, though, we could be seeing such a pattern because the models are estimated
in differences. Accordingly, I now turn to presenting the VAR results in levels. We
described the VAR procedure and its interpretation (through IRFs) in detail in the
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previous section. Just recall that impulse response functions trace the responses to
all variables in the system to a shock in a single variable. Most of the variables here
are theoretically uninteresting, so I isolate the relevant impulse responses. The most
important relationship here is between mood and policy outcomes. In particular,
the following models account for the endogeneity between rules, polarization, mood,
and policy. This robust specification allows for a powerful identification of the re-
lationship between policy and mood.3 Moreover, moods and policy both remain in
levels, allowing us to determine whether absolute increases in levels of mood lead
to corresponding changes in policy.4 In each case, the relevant mood series is in a
VAR system with consumer sentiment, policy outputs, rules, House polarization, and
Republican control, each with the contemporaneous levels and the lagged values.5
Turn first to the IRF in Figure 3.9. A standard-deviation increase in Republican
mood (meaning mood becoming more liberal)6 leads a 0.22-unit increase in stan-
dardized policy outputs (the policy outputs variable standardized about its mean),
meaning that policy becomes more liberal. This increase persists for four years, as
well. Compare this effect to the effect of a standard-deviation shock to Democratic
mood, illustrated in Figure 3.10. The estimated effect of an increase is smaller—only
around 0.18 units. This suggests that the relationship between Republican mood
and policy is stronger (in an absolute sense) than Democratic mood and policy. The
effect in Figure 3.10, however, persists for more time periods than the effect in Figure
3.9. The relationship between Democratic mood and policy, however, persists for a
3I don’t present full IRFs for the entire system, as many of the relationships are insignificant
and theoretically uninteresting. Granger causality tests are available from the author.
4Of course, we already have evidence for the general relationship between full mood and policy,
discussed earlier (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). But their evidence does not consider
lawmaking in particular, and it does not account fully for the changing nature of polarization.
5The reader is advised that a low number of degrees of freedom are available. The limiting
variable is policy: interest group ratings from multiple groups are only available since the 1970s.
6This effect would be the same if I reversed the coding.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse Response Function: Republican Mood on Policy.
longer time period.
The relationship between Independent mood and policy is much weaker. Note the
IRF in Figure 3.11. The effect of a standard-deviation shock to Independent mood on
policy only barely reaches statistical significance. Even then, it is only significant for
a single time period and dies out quickly. In a system that accounts for polarization,
restrictive lawmaking, and partisan mood, it seems as if Independents lose out in
that process.
The relationship between full mood (the classic Stimson measure) and policy
is presented in Figure 3.12. A standard-deviation shock to full mood leads to an
immediate increase in policy liberalism, again reflecting the general pattern of rep-
resentation observed at the partisan level. Note, however, that the magnitude of
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Figure 3.10: Impulse Response Function: Democratic Mood on Policy.
this increase is considerably smaller, especially than the Republican effect in Figure
3.9. However, this effect lasts much longer than either of the other partisan effects:
a shock to full mood has lingering effects on the system for up to seven years. In
general, then, while all partisan groups seem to receive some representation, that
representation varies both in immediate magnitude as well as lingering effects across
partisan groups.
Three other patterns of effects from the respective VARs are worth investigating.
First it is reasonable to wonder what the effect of lawmaking (that is, rules) is on
partisan mood? After observing partisan or contentious lawmaking strategies, do
partisan groups become more or less conservative or liberal? Figure 3.13 presents
the results of the IRF of rules on Republican mood. The pattern is intriguing. The
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Figure 3.11: Impulse Response Function: Independent Mood on Policy.
effect of a standard-deviation shock to the usage of rules is to immediately make
Republicans more conservative. That is, simply observing a contentious lawmaking
process makes Republicans want more conservative policy outputs. This pattern of
effects is not present for any other partisan subgroup.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 display two last interesting results from the VAR. Namely,
how do partisan subgroups respond in their preferences to observing elite polariza-
tion? For Democrats and Independents, at least, it makes them demand more liberal
policies. For Independents, the effect of a standard-deviation shock to polarization is
actually quite considerable: a 0.20 unit increase in standardized Independent mood.
This effect persists for roughly eight time periods, too. For Democrats, the effect is
less pronounced. A standard-deviation shock to House polarization increases stan-
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Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Function: Full Mood on Policy.
dardized Democratic mood to become more liberal by about 0.15 units. This effect,
however, persists for a longer time period. Such a shock only decays after almost ten
years. Increases in polarization, then, have real and lasting influences on partisan
moods.7 Recall also that, since this is a VAR, those shocks to partisan mood are reen-
tered into the system as effects on policy. This is true also for the effects of lawmaking
on Republican mood. Since we observe a general pattern of representation—partisan
moods broadly are reflected into policy—increases in polarization have the effect of
increasing liberal policy (through making Democratic demands more liberal), and in-
creases in the usage of rules have the effect of increasing conservative policy (through
making Republican demands more conservative). This system has real effects.
7These effects are not significant for Republicans.
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Figure 3.13: Impulse Response Function: Rules on Republican Mood.
The final pattern of effects involves the co-partisan mood series. Figure 3.16 dis-
plays the estimated effect of co-partisan mood on policy outputs, accounting for the
other variables in the system. Note two attributes of these effects. First, they are
greater in absolute magnitude than any of the separate partisan mood series. That
is, when we account for polarization and rules in an endogenous system, shifts in
co-partisan mood are best represented in policy outputs, better than any separate
partisan group or in the policy demands of the entire public (full mood). Sec-
ond, these effects take longer to decay than the other partisan groups as well. The
effects of shifts in co-partisan mood last as long as five years, as opposed to a near-
instantaneous decay for Independents and a three- or four-year period for Democrats
and Republicans. Once we account for the system of effects, co-partisans certainly
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Figure 3.14: Impulse Response Function: House Polarization on Democratic Mood.
seem to be well represented by policy in a polarized world.
3.4 Conclusion
The quality of representation certainly varies. One particularly interesting way
that elite (and possibly mass) polarization might cause the quality of representation
to vary systematically is the responsiveness of policy to particular constituencies,
especially as lawmaking changes. As elite polarization increases, Democrats should
become especially more responsive to Democrats, Republicans to Republicans, and
Independents might lose out in the process. Moreover, conflictual lawmaking strate-
gies, like the use of special rules, might exacerbate these partisan representational
benefits.
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Figure 3.15: Impulse Response Function: House Polarization on Independent Mood.
There is, at best, mixed support for these expectations. We observe support
(though statistically insignificant) for H12 in Figure 3.8, as changes in the general
usage of rules led to changes in policy, as co-partisan mood changed. In addition,
there was no direct representation of the full constituency through the use of rules in
Table 3.1, suggesting again that only co-partisans are to benefit from changing rules
as polarization changes. So the theory is diffusely supported by that evidence.
Evidence for H13 and H14 is much weaker. In Table 3.5, changes in co-partisan
mood do not have a direct effect on changes in policy (even in the non-interactive
specifications), and none of the interactions are statistically significant, indicating
that the relationship is not conditional on the usage of rules to achieve policy change
in the direction of mass co-partisans of the majority party in the House. In fact,
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Figure 3.16: Impulse Response Function: Co-partisan Mood on Policy.
only in Figure 3.16 do we observe evidence that, as co-partisan mood changes, so do
policy outputs. Again, these effects are estimated in levels.
We uncover some indirect support for the theory presented in Section 2. In all
cases, partisan control of the House has real effects on policy outputs. Republicans
are consistent creators of more conservative policy than their liberal counterparts.
In differences, however, the theory receives little support. The evidence for basic
representational linkages—changes in mood causing changes in policy—is lacking.
The conditional theoretical support—those changes in mood being conditional on
lawmaking strategies—is only observed for Republicans, and even then not in the
expected direction. As Republican mood decreases (becomes more conservative),
increases in rules make policy more liberal, not conservative. There is considerable
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question whether these effects are well identified, however.
When we turn to the more appropriate statistical tests, we receive better support
for the theory. The theory is better supported in levels. From the VARs, the basic
representational linkage is always present. Shifts in partisan moods (as well as overall
mood) lead to changes in policy. More interesting are Figures 3.13 to 3.15. The usage
of rules also causes Republicans to grow more conservative. Observing a lawmaking
process full of conflict is enough to make Republicans demand more conservative
policy outputs. Another opportunity for future research is whether this effect is also
conditional on party control. Interestingly, there is considerable reason to think it is
not. As Republicans observe conflictual lawmaking in a Republican-led House, they
might reward it by demanding more conservative (and, in an elite-polarized world,
more “acceptable”) policy. At the same time, if Republicans observe conflictual
lawmaking by Democrats, they might withdraw into the party fold and grow more
conservative out of annoyance with the majority party. Both patterns of effects are
plausible. These effects do not exist for any other partisan group.
For Independents and Democrats, polarization has more interesting effects on
mood. As elite polarization increases, both Democrats and Independents become
more liberal. For Democrats, this pattern makes more immediate sense. Observing a
world of elite-level conflict that extends to multiple issues (Carsey and Layman 2006),
Democrats might respond by developing more liberal preferences. Independents are
harder to characterize. They might be behaving closer to Democrats than to “true”
Independents, or it could be that recent policy times characterized by high levels
of polarization might also simply be more liberal than others. Again, more data is
necessary. The short time series available here limits our ability to test theory, both
in the sense of a small N for testing theory as well as limited observations of both
parties in power at differing levels of polarization.
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These analysis present multiple opportunities for future research, and they raise
many questions. Representational patterns certainly exist, but they also almost
certainly vary as polarization changes over time. The theoretical nature of that
relationship should continue to be a research focus for political science.
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4. RESTRICTIVE RULES AND PUBLIC APPROVAL
The preceding sections have provided considerable evidence for the differential
behavior of Congress on the basis of partisanship. Democrats and Republicans use
rules systematically in response to the changing nature of the parties. Moreover,
those rules are used to respond differently to Republican and Democratic public
opinion, depending on which party has the majority in Congress.
This section tests a logical implication of those patterns. If the usage of rules is
changing over time, and Republicans and Democrats use rules differently to respond
to their co-partisans, we might naturally wonder whether these processes affect public
approval of Congress, either in the aggregate (among all individuals) or specifically
among partisan identifiers.
This section sheds new light on a longstanding research question. Scholars have
long been interested in the dynamics of public approval of policymaking institu-
tions. In the American context the obvious legislature is Congress. And conven-
tional wisdom regarding public approval of Congress maintains that approval of it
is abysmally low. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 1) go so far as to say that, be-
cause of the frictional nature of policymaking in Congress, “public negativity [toward
Congress] pours forth with only the slightest provocation and has been duly recorded
by countless political observers.” Such claims are discouraging. But they are also
rarely tested. And traditional tests of this conventional wisdom ignore potentially
important dynamics among subsets of the public.
This study sheds new light on the phenomenon of public approval of Congress.
Based on the implied logic of the theory—that certain representational outcomes
vary systematically with the use of rules by party—it breaks entirely with past re-
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search by creating new series of Republican, Democratic, and Independent approval
of Congress, rather than examining approval solely in the aggregate.
Moreover, it leverages the unique lawmaking series discussed in earlier sections
to offer new insights concerning approval and lawmaking. To be sure, the creation of
policy is still a “sausage-making” process in which testimony, markup, amendment,
and debate cloud the public’s perception of Congressional productivity. But new
lawmaking strategies—particularly the rules discussed throughout this dissertation—
have shifted the means by which policy, especially the most partisan policy, is crafted.
The following analyses represent a first attempt at including these new types of
lawmaking in our understanding of approval.
In so doing, this section sheds light on several conventional assumptions regarding
the approval of Congress: that it is abysmally low, that it is evaluated in terms of
members, not the institution, and that it is particularly disliked because of the ex-
plicitly partisan nature of lawmaking. To begin the analysis, though, it is important
to review these assumptions in past literature.
4.1 Past Work on Congressional Approval
Scholars have long been interested in approval of or confidence in the major
American institutions, especially the presidency (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995;
Kinder 1981; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Kriner and Schwartz 2009) and the judiciary
(Gibson 1989; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003;
Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Of the three major American political institutions,
however, Congressional approval has received by far the least amount of attention.
Initial forays into the determinants of Congressional approval simply replicated
models of approval of other institutions and applied them to the legislature. Parker’s
(1977) original analysis, though, found that many of the variables that affect presi-
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dential approval—rally-around-the-flag effects, economic slumps, and Barber’s (1972)
positive-active presidents—significantly affect Congressional approval. Improvements
in theoretical specification clarified the process of Congressional approval in two ways:
accounting for those activities specific to Congressional lawmaking and elaborating
on the distinction between Congress and member.
Evidence for the importance of Congressional activity comes at both the longi-
tudinal and cross-sectional levels. In perhaps the canonical time series analysis of
Congressional approval, Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) find that aggregate
Congressional approval is highly autoregressive; positively responsive to positive me-
dia coverage of Congress; negatively responsive to important legislation, institutional
strife as operationalized through veto overrides, conflict, and scandals; and unrespon-
sive to vetoes, minor legislation, and presidential approval. Ramirez (2009) extends
the analysis (using an extension of the same approval series) and finds that parti-
san lawmaking generally (such as cloture votes, scandals, and partisan conflicts) is
associated with decreases in Congressional approval. Ramirez (2013) clarifies the
puzzling negative finding of important legislation—if Congress overcomes its inher-
ent gridlock to pass policy, we should think it would be rewarded—by demonstrating
that only when policy is out-of-step with public opinion is Congress punished.
In perhaps the canonical cross-sectional analysis, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995)
find that individuals hold generally low evaluations of Congress, partly because of
unrealistic expectations of compromise and bipartisanship in the political process.
This echoes the broader sentiment of low Congressional approval on the basis of
Washington “changing” the character of members of Congress to become partisan
robots rather than noble compromisers. For instance, Kimball and Patterson (1997)
and Grant and Rudolph (2004) demonstrate that levels of approval of Congress are
generally low because individual perceptions of members of Congress fail to meet
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their expectations of those members.1 Lipset and Schneider (1983) demonstrate that
the feeling of “Congress losing touch” with reality drives approval lower as well. In
all, then, existing evidence suggests that the uniquely discomforting way in which
Congress makes policy leaves a negative image in most minds when individuals decide
whether to approve of Congress.
The second broad distinction is that of Congress from member. Given the sparse-
ness of questions about approval of members of Congress over time, evidence on this
point is almost entirely cross-sectional or time-series cross-sectional. Here again,
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) suggest that since individuals do not expect or
approve of the political process of lawmaking outlined above, they respond by asym-
metrically rating their own member of Congress highly but rating the institution
poorly. Parker and Davidson (1979) suggest that some of this divergence might also
be driven by the ability of the member to shore up approval through district-level
activities such as service and personal campaigning.
Interestingly, ratings of Congress and member might have some effect on one
another. Kimball and Patterson (1997) and Jones and McDermott (2002) both find
that positive evaluations of incumbent members significantly lead respondents to
rate Congress higher as a body. Grant and Rudolph (2004), through a bivariate
probit model, suggest that unobserved common factors drive a significant portion
of the joint relationship between the two evaluations. This evidence, though, is
cross-sectional, and likely suffers from endogeneity problems. The only study that
attempts to tease out this endogeneity is Born (1990), who uses two-stage least-
squares in repeated cross-sections to evaluate whether judgments of members are
endogenous to judgments of the institution. He finds that they are: but only for the
1And, in part, these expectations are driven by failure of “noble” policymaking such as loyalty
to party, seeking personal gain or profit, and self-interest in reelection.
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least educated respondents. Accordingly, without better longitudinal evidence, we
are unlikely to know the nature of the exact interplay between these two concepts.
A much broader class of national- or government-level (that is, not specific to
Congress) factors also affects Congressional approval. At both the longitudinal
level (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Ramirez 2009; Ramirez 2013; Box-
Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 2000;2 Lebo 2008)3 and cross-sectional (individual)
level (Grant and Rudolph 2004; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Patterson and
Caldeira 1990; Rudolph 2002;4 McDermott and Jones 2003), there is strong evi-
dence that the economy moves sentiment toward Congress. Some find an interplay
with other institutional approval levels, such as the president (Kimball and Patter-
son 1997; Ramirez 2009; Jones and McDermott 2002; Lebo 2008; McDermott and
Jones 2003; but see Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Durr, Gilmour, and Wol-
brecht 1997). There is also evidence of a general trust in government effect (Ramirez
2013; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000), as well as an effect of political efficacy
(Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992; Grant and Rudolph 2004; but see Jones and
McDermott 2002). In all, some clearly non-Congress specific factors partially deter-
mine the process of Congressional approval.5
So we have a broad sense of the determinants of the process of Congressional
approval. Yet few studies have studied the dynamics of Congressional approval in
recent periods of increasing mass and elite polarization. Few studies (Ramirez 2009,
2013) extend the analysis past 2000. And no cross-sectional study exists that lever-
ages the changing nature of polarization over time. This is particularly troubling
2Specifically that Congressional approval and economic expectations are fractionally cointegrated
3Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997), Ramirez (2009), and Ramirez (2013) follow the Durr
(1993) practice of purging economic expectations from real economic conditions.
4Specifically economic retrospections.
5There is some irony in mentioning these contextual factors, given that many of them do not
appear in later models. The overarching problem is data limitation. The creation of partisan
measures of Congressional approval is simply not possible prior to the 1970s
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given that Congress is consistently found to be the most polarized institution over
time (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008). If polarization should affect the dynam-
ics of approval of a single institution, then, it should be Congress, especially given
the public’s established distaste for partisan politics. But we have little evidence on
this question in recent periods of polarization. This work expands on these changing
dynamics. Particularly, it uses the general theory offered in previous sections to
deduce the logical implications of partisan lawmaking for approval.
4.2 Polarization and the Need for Disaggregation
There is ample evidence that Congress has grown more polarized. Previous
sections have alluded to this phenomenon generally, but by a variety of measures
(NOMINATE: Poole and Rosenthal 2007; inflation-adjusted ADA scores: Grose-
close, Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Anderson and Habel 2009; common space Bayesian
scores: Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; NPAT survey scores: Ansolabehere, Sny-
der, and Stewart 2001a), members of Congress (MCs) have grown more ideologically
extreme and separated from one another on the basis of party identification.
There is no such agreement on mass polarization. Some (such as Abramowitz
2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) point to
a growing divergence of the mean response to the seven-point ideology scale by
party identification, paired with similarly more extreme responses on issue specific
questions (such as gay marriage or abortion, see Hetherington and Weiler 2010), as
evidence of polarization in the electorate. Others (like Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope
2011) claim that such polarization is an artifact of polarized elite choices, noting
that few respondents place themselves in extreme survey response categories. In
their view, at most, individuals realign their ideological beliefs to fit their party
identification through a process called “sorting” (Levendusky 2009).
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Despite these observations, however, little work has considered how the polarized
nature of the mass and the elite affects mass evaluations of elite institutions. Even
more generally, scholars have only investigated the partisan dynamics of approval
for one institution: the presidency. Instead, scholars have relied on “marginals” of
approval ratings in the aggregate of surveys. This study extends our understanding
of Congressional approval by accounting for whether the dynamics of approval vary
across partisan identifiers.
Accounting for partisan dynamics has the potential to resolve the puzzlingly in-
consistent effects of party identification across previous research. Some (McDermott
and Jones 2003; Grant and Rudolph 2004; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson,
Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) find that party identification conditions whether an in-
dividual approves of Congress, but others (Born 1990; Jones and McDermott 2002;
Adler and Wilkerson 2013, 48) find no evidence for such an effect. Each of these
studies, though, is cross-sectional, with the authors forced to make comparisons
about between party identification and control of Congress. Better quality evidence
on this point would compare the feelings of different groups of partisans over time,
accounting for the shifting nature of party control.
The basic research question here is how the dynamics of Congressional approval
respond to Congress through changing periods of polarization: which necessitates
an examination of the role of party identification. How, then, should we exam-
ine the role of party identification over time, given the above limitations? I fol-
low the lead of others who study phenomena that are thought to exhibit separate
dynamics among Republicans and Democrats over time, especially as polarization
increases: disaggregate the series. For instance, Ura and Ellis (2012) disaggregate
public mood (Stimson 1999) into separate series for Republicans, Democrats, and
Independents. Kriner and Schwartz (2009) do the same for presidential approval.
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Both find that aggregation—especially in times of polarization—masks important
dynamics between party identifiers.
A natural extension, then, is to disaggregate Congressional approval by party
identification as well. We should expect that sharp partisan divisions affect eval-
uations of political institutions, especially polarized institutions. Most simply, we
should expect that a polarized electorate should diverge in its evaluations of Congress
across partisan cleavages, relying on partisan cues to evaluate the institution. That
is, Republicans should evaluate Congress differently than Democrats in an era of po-
larization, but they should especially evaluate Republican Congresses differently than
Democratic Congresses. These basic dynamics have not been tested. This analysis,
then, offers a first cut at the basic dynamics of approval in polarized conditions.
4.3 Theoretical Expectations
We noted above the inconsistent findings regarding the effects of party identifica-
tion on Congressional approval. In might be possible to reconcile this inconsistency
by treating Republican, Democrat, and Independent approval as separate phenom-
ena. But what should our expectations be for the behavior of these series?
Two papers in particular provide some insight. Jones and McDermott (2002) find
that individual evaluations of Congress are shaped by perceived ideological distance
from members of the Congressional majority party. For Democrats, when Democrats
control the Congress, this ideological distance should be much lower than when
Republicans control Congress (vice versa for Republicans). So we should expect
approval among Democrats to be higher under Democratic Congresses than under
Republican ones.
Suggesting that aggregate approval should respond to changes in control of Congress
obviously requires some basic political knowledge. Though political knowledge among
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Americans is persistently low (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, but see Gibson and
Caldeira 2009), we believe that the majority are sufficiently aware of the control of
the Congress. Kimball and Patterson (1997), writing at a time of the first Repub-
lican House in a decade, note that Republicans rated the new Congress higher, as
opposed to the traditional effect of Democratic identification increasing approval.
They note specifically that “[the] citizen sensitivity to partisan change in Congress
is quite remarkable” (Kimball and Patterson 1997, 720).
Polarization should exacerbate these dynamics. That is, as polarization increases
at both the elite and mass levels, Republicans should be particularly satisfied with
Congress when it is controlled by Republicans (and ostensibly pushing Republican
policy goals) and particularly dissatisfied with Congress when it is controlled by
Democrats (vice versa for Democrats). Independents, interestingly, should just ap-
prove of Congress at lower and lower rates: given that their ideology should not be
changing, they should just generally disapprove of the ideological extremity in the
Congress.
Moreover, previous sections illuminate specific reasons that co-partisans should
approve of Congress through periods of polarization. Most specifically, rules of cer-
tain stripes in a polarized Congress are used to accomplish partisan policy change.
This suggests a straightforward expectation that directly confronts prior literature:
conflictual policymaking should not be viewed negatively by all individuals. Those
who identify with the majority party in Congress should support that institution
more when it uses restrictive rules, because those rules are being used to accomplish
partisan goals.
The theory offered in previous sections suggests specifically that partisans should
be most responsive to particular types of rules series. In particular, majority-party
identifiers should approve most of the use of positive substantive rules, as they help
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accomplish the most partisan policy. Accordingly, I offer the following formal hy-
potheses:
H15: As electoral polarization increases, identifiers with the majority
party in the House will increasingly reward the use of positive substantive
power and positive procedural power with approval. The opposite holds true
among minority-party identifiers.
H16: The traditional explanation of Congressional approval should always hold
true among non-partisans (Independents). They should react negatively to the
increasing use of positive procedural and substantive powers.
4.4 Data and Methods
The basic need in this analysis is a quality, extended measure of the parti-
san nature of the approval of Congress. Most previous aggregate analyses (Durr,
Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Lebo 2008; Ramirez 2009; Ramirez 2013; Patterson
and Caldeira 1990) rely on an amalgam of surveys regarding Congressional approval,
leveraging as many as forty different question types all broadly meant to tap a di-
mension of the public’s job approval of Congress. This might be acceptable if we
wish to understand how approval of Congress as a diffuse concept moves over time.
But because I wish to examine the separate dynamics of approval for each party, I
prefer to focus instead on consistent surveys of a single survey question by a sin-
gle survey house over time.6 This practice should ensure that the series has strong
validity across parties and over time.
Accordingly, this study uses all 143 surveys containing the question “Do you ap-
prove or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?” fielded by Gallup from
the first administration (1974) to 2012. I then disaggregate the data by party iden-
tification and calculate the approval rate for Congress for Republicans, Democrats,
and Independents. Leaners are treated as Independents, given that the followup
6This strategy of focusing on a single survey question is also used by Rudolph (2002).
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Figure 4.1: Congressional Approval: Republicans, Democrats, Independents, and
the Full Sample.
leaner question was not asked before 1986, which would change the sample sub-
stantially over time. The surveys, of course, are not fielded regularly over time, so
we need some way to smooth them into an annual measure. Accordingly, I used
Stimson’s (1999) WCALC program to produce a recursively smoothed measure of
partisan Congressional approval over time.7 The final measure is an annual series of
approval, by party, from 1974 to 2012. The series are presented in Figure 4.1, with
the approval rate of the full sample (the traditional measure) overlaid.
7I used WCALC5. Since all survey houses are Gallup, and I am simply using WCALC to smooth
over irregular time intervals (as opposed to time intervals and survey houses), there is little risk
that WCALC is causing a data problem.
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Note three particular aspects of Figure 4.1. First, the gap between the different
partisan approvals of Congress seems to grow over time, particularly in the most
recent years. The gap between Republicans and Democrats was only more than 20
points in one year, before the mid-1990s. Since then, the gap has only been be-
low 20 points in two years: in 2005 and 2006, when neither party liked Congress.
Second, in more proximate times, the gap seems to be severely influenced by major-
ity control of Congress. That is, Republican approval of Congress nearly bottomed
out in 2008 after losing both chambers to Democrats, and only slightly recovered
in 2010, after retaking the House of Representatives. The opposite dynamics hold
among Democrats, but beginning as early as 2002. Third, note that Congressional
approval actually reaches exceptionally high levels—and on multiple occasions. Ap-
proval among Republicans was over 65% around 2000; approval among Democrats
hovered over 50% during Democratic control of Congress under President Reagan.
We do not observe a “short memory and a tendency to return to some natural, low
level” (Lebo 2008, 4) in the dynamics of Congressional approval. This directly re-
buffs conventional wisdom, such as popular bemoaning of a Congressional approval
“in the single-digits.” When we account for partisanship, approval of Congress can
reach over 50%.
The reader might have noticed that this section, like the one before it, simpli-
fies the polarization dimension to a single aggregate measure, rather than the dis-
tance/minority variance/majority variance framework of the second section. Again,
this is out of statistical necessity. While it might be preferable to examine the effects
of each dimension of CPG separately, such a short time series, especially with respect
to partisan Congressional approval, makes such an approach unfeasible. Addition-
ally, the main theoretical effects (that is, the differential effect of partisan lawmaking
by party identification) should respond to polarization, measured generally. Accord-
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ingly, this section uses the general measure of polarization from Wood and Jordan
(2011), discussed previously. Recall that this measure of polarization ranges from
zero to one, with zero indicating full overlap between parties (no polarization) and
one indicating no overlap between parties (total polarization). As OLS coefficients
estimate the effect of a one-unit increase in a variable, the estimates for the effect of
polarization seem erratically large. This is because they are estimating the effect of a
move from no polarization to complete polarization (which would never be observed
in reality). Despite this, I am reluctant to recode polarization for just this section.
This is for two reasons. The first is that it would make the measure inconsistent
with previous sections and hamper readability. The second is that the effect of po-
larization is always interpreted at substantively realistic levels. So there is little risk
of drawing incorrect inferences.
Additionally, rules are examined only at the aggregate level. Certainly, some rules
(like substitutes considered as adopted) should be more preferred by co-partisans
than others, as they directly lead to more substantive policy change (see Section 2).
However, causally, it is asking too much for respondents to be aware of the content
of rules, though they might well be aware of their presence. Accordingly, I use the
overall rules series in the analysis, assuming that respondents are generally aware of
when lawmaking is happening in a conflictual way (Ramirez 2013). Some readers
might be dissatisfied with whether mass respondents know when special rules are
used to pass legislation. I offer two responses. The first is that prior literature,
including that cited above, has found consistent effects for the usage of rules on
Congressional approval. The second is that even if respondents are not aware of
rules particularly, rules serve as a good proxy for partisan Congressional conflict
generally. That is, we can use rules as a general indicator of lawmaking happening
in a conflictual, non-textbook way. Moreover, they are particularly representative
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of majority party leadership powers being used to construct legislation, especially in
periods of high polarization. So even if respondents are not aware of the actual rules
themselves, the series still serves as a good proxy for the effect of partisan lawmaking
reflected in the theory.
Similar to the previous section, I account for economic context with the Index of
Consumer Sentiment. Republican control is a simple dummy variable for whether
Republicans have control of the House. The final control is borrowed from Ramirez
(2013). Ramirez finds that it is not the creation of major policy that is important for
Congressional approval, but how far that policy diverges from constituent desires.
Accordingly, I include a measure of how major policy (as described in the previous
sections) deviates from the specific co-partisan demand for policy—as described in
the partisan moods from Ura and Ellis (2012). Policy Divergence, then, is how
much the actual Congressional outputs deviate from desired partisan outputs (with
“partisan outputs” measured, as appropriate, in each partisan model of approval).
The modeling strategy is identical to the previous section. Each of the approval
measures is integrated, so I test for effects in partial adjustment models in differences.
Explicitly, then, we are explaining changes in each of the partisan approval series.
These models are especially theoretically appropriate, as the theory predicts changes
in approval as other factors (number of rules, amount of polarization) change, not
their absolute levels. In addition, Johansen tests do not indicate that none of the
sets of variables are cointegrated. Partisan approvals seem to track together, but
recall that the theory treats them separately, rather than in the same model.
Some might also wonder why the models presented here do not model Congres-
sional approval as a fractionally integrated series, as previous work has done. I have
three responses. The first is that fractional integration usually arises when aggre-
gating over independent auto-regressive processes. Such is the case here, as I argue
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that traditional estimates of “full” approval aggregate over (increasingly) heteroge-
nous approval by party identification. In other words, our aggregating the different
partisan series of approval to create a “full” series of all approval might itself be
inducing fractional integration.8 Second, and far more importantly, the data do not
support a reliable estimate of the fractional integration parameter d. Recent work
has demonstrated that robust estimates of d require upwards of 10,000 data points
(Keele, Linn, and Webb 2015). The analysis here falls short of that requirement.
Third, even if we do estimate the fractional differencing parameter d (which, again,
we probably should not do with such a short time series), each estimate’s 90% con-
fidence interval overlaps with one, again indicating integration.9 The estimate for
Republican approval is actually exactly one: again presenting evidence for integration
over fractional integration when dealing with partisan approval.
In all sets of models, the most important theoretical predictor is the triple in-
teraction between Republican control, changes in rules, and changes in polarization.
Republican control accounts for the key theoretical addition: that approval should
vary on the basis of who controls the institution. Partisans should especially reward
control of the institution, however, when the party is using that control to pursue
8There are two ways to follow this logic, discussed abstractly in Granger (1980) and applied
specifically to Congressional approval by Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson (2000). The first is a
forgiving definition of “auto-regressive.” Of course, for something to be truly auto-regressive, the
same respondents need to be sampled and draw on their previous responses in formulating their
current one. Since approval series are created from random (and different) samples, it cannot meet
this strict definition. The argument, though, is that each partisan has an equal probability of being
sampled, and partisans follow identical processes when generating their approval estimates. So par-
tisan approval is auto-regressive in the broad sense that, for instance, Republicans think in the same
general way as other Republicans when generating their approval of Congress (and this thought
process is auto-regressive). The second is much less demanding. Granger (1980) originally also
demonstrates that fractional integration can arise when there are heterogenous dynamic relation-
ships at the individual level that are aggregated over. As the analysis in this section demonstrates,
partisans approve of Congress differently, based on their party identification (and are thus heteroge-
nous). In either case, aggregating over partisanship is what is inducing the fractional integration.
Following this logic, by disaggregating the series by partisan identification, we might observe this
fractional integration disappearing.
9Stata refuses to even estimate d for such short time series.
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Table 4.1: Fractional Integration Parameters Estimates for Congressional Approval
Series
Series GPH Estimate of d
Full Congressional Approval 0.725 (0.199)
Democratic Congressional Approval 0.733 (0.199)
Republican Congressional Approval 1.019 (0.199)
Independent Congressional Approval 0.755 (0.199)
Estimates from RATS procedures @gph.
∗Estimate indicates integration.
partisan goals. Accordingly, changes in the number of rules should be especially
powerful when their party is in charge. Moreover, partisans should value both of
these changes more as polarization increases. If the distance between the parties
is decreasing, according to the theory in Section 2, parties will pursue less partisan
goals. Co-partisans, however, should approve more of the institution as polarization
increases and the changes in rules increase. This interaction should be positive for
Republicans (using rules to pursue partisan goals as distance increases in a Repub-
lican Congress). It should be negative for Democrats. Like conventional wisdom, it
is not expected to matter theoretically for Independents or all respondents. Each
table also presents the results of estimating the constituent terms of that interaction
(Republican control times changes in rules, changes in polarization times changes in
rules, and Republican control times changes in polarization).
4.5 Results
Recall that the general expectation is that approval of Congress varies by parti-
sanship, as expressed formally in H15. This expectation is in contrast to the conven-
tional wisdom, that all respondents follow the same process of approval. The first
place to start, then, is the conventional model. How does full approval (among all
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Table 4.2: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (All Respondents)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
∆Yt−1 -0.050 -0.028 -0.047 -0.208 -0.275∗
(0.175) (0.171) (0.178) (0.147) (0.154)
Policy Divergence -2.797 -1.395 -3.077 2.897 3.032
(5.908) (5.826) (6.023) (4.998) (4.955)
∆Rules (All) -0.071 -0.133∗ -0.055∗ -0.146∗∗ -0.099
(0.069) (0.077) (0.079) (0.059) (0.074)
∆Consumer Sentiment 0.238 0.311∗ 0.274∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.448∗∗
(0.150) (0.154) (0.173) (0.125) (0.144)
Republican Control 0.975 0.855 1.107 0.814 2.065
(2.579) (2.516) (2.632) (2.095) (2.245)
∆House Polarization -3.053 -10.758 -2.317 -32.976 -34.751
(28.924) (28.610) (29.369) (24.615) (24.316)
Republican Control∗ - 0.233 - - -0.122
∆Rules (All) (0.145) (0.149)
∆House Polarization∗ - - -1.049 - -2.351
∆Rules (All) (2.397) (2.205)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - 368.186∗∗ 514.105∗∗
Republican Control (90.649) (130.197)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - - -4.146
Republican Control∗ (4.276)
∆Rules (All)
Constant -0.322 -0.689 -0.147 -2.086 -2.015
(2.622) (2.567) (2.688) (2.173) (2.172)
R2 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.44 0.51
N 37 37 37 37 37
AIC 6.988 6.958 6.908 6.592 6.779
BIC 136.229 136.713 133.282 123.176 139.790
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
individuals) vary with respect to the traditional theoretical model, including basic
information about the number of rules passed? Table 4.2 presents the results.
Not much is interesting in this set of models. In Model 1, with no interactive
specifications, none of the coefficients is significant.10 Policy divergence, changes
10In what will be a common theme, many findings are consistent in direction with current lit-
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in rules, changes in consumer sentiment, Republican control, and changes in House
polarization all exert no significant effects on changes in House approval. In fact,
policy divergence is never significant in any of the model specifications, regardless
of partisanship. This could also be due to the shortened time series, or that policy
divergence is notable in the short run (that is, quarterly), but averages over years
(for instance by the end of a Congressional session).
Models 2 - 5 test the interactive effects of changes in House polarization, Repub-
lican control, and changes in rules, culminating in the triple interaction in Model 5.
Model 2 interacts Republican control with changes in rules, testing the possibility
that respondents reward or punish the usage of rules especially when one or the
other party controls the House. When we account for this potentially conditional
effect, the conventional finding of positive changes in consumer sentiment improving
Congressional approval emerges. The interactive term itself is insignificant, but the
presence of the interaction leads the coefficient on changes in rules—now representing
those changes when the Democratic party is in control—to statistical significance.
There is no a priori reason to expect that Democrats should be especially punished
for the increased use of rules. This potentially confusing finding, coupled with the
insignificant interaction, leads us to suspect that it is important to disaggregate
approval.
Model 3 reflects the same patterns. Changes in consumer sentiment positively
affect full approval when we account for the potential interaction between changes in
polarization and changes in rules. Now, additionally, changes in rules have negative
erature, but not in significance. This is due mostly to the severely truncated N in the present
analysis. Most previous analysis (such as Ramirez 2013) analyzes Congressional approval as a
quarterly variable. I believe that the public does not update its opinion toward Congress on a
quarterly basis. Additionally, when considering partisan Congressional approval, the data do not
support a quarterly series until the mid-1990s. At this point, there is not enough variation in one
of the key independent variables—House polarization—to support a valid analysis.
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effect on full approval, a theoretically expected effect, but only when House polar-
ization does not change (the interactive term is zero). Moreover, this interaction is
not statistically significant.
Model 4, however, brings substantial changes to our understanding of approval.
Note that our explanatory power increases substantially. By any measure of fit
criteria, Model 4 does the best job of explaining changes in full approval, especially
when accounting for the number of predictors in Model 5 (with AIC and BIC).
Model 4 supports conventional wisdom in a number of ways, too. The effect of
changes in rules on changes in approval is negative, statistically significant, and
unconditional (there is no interaction term with changes in rules). A one-unit year-
over-year increase in the number of rules used leads to a 0.146-unit decrease in year-
over-year Congressional approval among all respondents. Using five more rules than
the year prior, then, is enough to depress Congressional approval by a full percentage
point. Consumer sentiment also is significant in the anticipated direction.
The theoretically interesting finding, of course, is the interaction. If the effect of
X is conditional on Z, the effect of Z is also conditional on X (Brambor, Clark, and
Golder 2006). Accordingly, I interpret the interactive effect in both “directions.”
The marginal effect of changes in House polarization across Republican control is
presented in Figure 4.2, and the marginal effect of changes in Republican control
across changes in House polarization is presented in Figure 4.3. In all cases in this
section, marginal effects are interpreted at 90% confidence intervals. In my view, the
extraordinarily small N justifies exploring effects that fail to meet the traditional 95%
threshold. Many of these effects are theoretically consistent and close to traditional
significance, so it is worth exploring them here.
Turn first to Figure 4.2. Recall that the theoretical range of the polarization vari-
able used in this analysis is from zero—complete overlap between the two parties—to
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Effect of Changes in Polarization across Party Control (All
Respondents).
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one—no overlap whatsoever. These seemingly extraordinary effects, then, are due
to the scale of the variable. A “one-unit increase in year-over-year polarization” is
equivalent to moving from completely unpolarized parties to completely polarized
parties in a single year. This is quite a large effect! Accordingly, a “reasonable”
effect of changes in polarization is about 10% of the size of the coefficient. Figure
4.2 indicates that, when Democrats control the House (Republican control is zero on
the x-axis), changes in polarization have no marginal effect on changes in approval
among all respondents. This finding makes sense, as for a great majority of Demo-
cratic control of the House, year-to-year increases in polarization were small at best.
The effect for when Republicans control the House, however, is large and significant.
A 0.10-unit increase in polarization from the previous value has the power to increase
House approval among all respondents by an incredible 30 units! Respondents seem
to reward polarization in the House when Republicans are in charge of the institution.
Figure 4.3 interprets the converse of this effect. Again, the same pattern emerges.
Note that the tightest confidence intervals are when changes in House polarization
are zero, indicating the need to interpret the values of changes in House polariza-
tion at reasonably small values. When House polarization decreases from year to
year, Republicans are punished for controlling the House (substantively significant
as well: when polarization falls by 0.10 units [again, 10% of the scale], respondents
decrease their approval of the House by close to 30 points). It seems clear that, when
considering all respondents together, individuals prefer when Republicans control a
polarizing House and Democrats control a depolarizing one.
The final model in Table 4.2 considers the theoretically anticipated triple inter-
action. Note that changes in consumer sentiment are still positive and significant.
None of the other unconditional coefficients are significant, however. Moreover, the
triple interaction is clearly insignificant, and only one interactive effect—the changes
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in polarization/Republican control interaction established in Model 4—is significant.
We have evidence in multiple pieces, then, that the preferred model for all respon-
dents is Model 4. Problematically, however, we have somewhat confusing effects.
There is no strong theoretical reason to anticipate that individuals should increase
their approval of Congress when it polarizes with Republicans in charge, but not
Democrats. There are multiple potential explanations. First, due to the time pe-
riod of the series, it just so happens that Democrats control most of the unpolarized
Houses under investigation and Republicans most of the polarized ones. It could be,
then, that the Republican control variable is soaking up some of the effect of polariza-
tion in the model. Here, though, we are constrained by data. Of course, the theory
offered here attempts to resolve this confusion. Mainly, this odd effect emerges be-
cause the full series averages over two incredibly distinct subsets—Republicans and
Democrats. Once we account for the partisanship of the respondent, this empirical
confusion should resolve itself. We turn to that in the next tables.
The first model of partisan approval is presented in Table 4.3: the results of
predicting Republican approval of Congress. So as to not belabor the point, Table 4.3
can be summarized more succinctly. In the base model (Model 1), with no interactive
terms), nothing is statistically significant. Most troubling, of course, is that not
even Republican control is independently significant. This suggests that there is
no unique benefit to Republicans by simply controlling the institution. Instead,
as we will uncover next, Republican identifiers in the mass public only increase or
decrease approval of the institution when that control is used strategically (that is,
interactively).
Unlike full approval, Model 2 presents the first piece of evidence that partisan-
ship matters for control of the institution and the pursuit of partisan goals. The
interactive effect of Republican control and changes in rules is statistically signifi-
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Table 4.3: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (Republicans)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
∆Yt−1 -0.075 0.087 -0.072 -0.140 -0.157
(0.180) (0.169) (0.183) (0.124) (0.142)
Policy Divergence -2.748 -0.033 -2.355 6.800 6.663
(8.241) (7.370) (8.490) (5.910) (5.921)
∆Rules (All) -0.159 -0.308∗∗ -0.177 -0.286∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(0.094) (0.098) (0.114) (0.068) (0.090)
∆Consumer Sentiment 0.273 0.416∗∗ 0.243 0.485∗∗ 0.580∗∗
(0.216) (0.198) (0.242) (0.153) (0.172)
Republican Control 5.215 3.347 5.060 2.579 1.732
(3.777) (3.412) (3.878) (2.635) (2.754)
∆House Polarization -1.716 -18.901 -2.630 -49.522∗ -48.499
(39.762) (35.767) (40.571) (28.606) (28.513)
Republican Control∗ - 0.600∗∗ - - -0.043
∆Rules (All) (0.208) (0.214)
∆House Polarization∗ - - 1.004 - -3.844
∆Rules (All) (3.415) (2.618)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - 603.767∗∗ 518.870∗∗
Republican Control (107.952) (161.731)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - - 8.322
Republican Control∗ (5.703)
∆Rules (All)
Constant -1.378 -1.398 -1.553 -3.406 -3.096
(3.296) (2.923) (3.405) (2.292) (2.315)
R2 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.63 0.68
N 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 7.626 7.407 7.681 6.895 7.117
BIC 150.065 144.152 153.479 126.736 143.447
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
cant. When Republican control is zero (that is, when Democrats control the House),
year-over-year increases in the number of rules used lead to significant decreases in
changes in Republican approval of the House (β = −0.308). This negative effect is
directly offset when Republicans control the House: the coefficient on the interaction
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is both larger in absolute value and in the positive direction (β = 0.600). Moreover,
the coefficient on Republican control alone—when changes in rules is zero—is in-
significant. Republican identifiers reward Republican control of the institution only
when that control is used to pass more rules, presumably in the pursuit of partisan
goals (as outlined in previous sections). (I wait to present marginal effects plots until
the full theoretical model, Model 5.)
Model 3 is statistically uninteresting, as none of the coefficients contributes sta-
tistically significantly to the understanding of changes in Republican approval. Note,
however, that this speaks to the conventional wisdom. There is nothing uniquely in-
dependent about changes in polarization or changes in the number of rules, or their
interactive effect, that bothers partisan identifiers. In other words, partisans are
not moved to approve of the institution more or less simply because those forms of
conflict do or do not exist. Instead, it is when that conflict is used for partisan ends
that matters for approval.
Model 5 of Table 4.3 is the most theoretically interesting. As stated above, it
accounts for the potential triple interaction of changes in polarization, changes in the
number of rules, and Republican control. First note that the triple interaction is in
the correct direction: when each of the constituent terms increase and Republicans
control the House, year-over-year Republican approval increases. The term itself,
however, misses statistical significance. However, the interactions jointly are signifi-
cant (F = 8.69, p = 0.0002), and the triple interaction term is close to meeting the
standard, with p = 0.16. I interpret the marginal effects of the triple interaction in
Figure 4.4, for a few reasons. The first is again simple data limitations. The effect is
theoretically consistent, but the analyst must appreciate the short time frame in the
analysis N = 34. This could especially be problematic, given the relatively few years
that Republicans have controlled the House. If we interpret the findings in Model
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4, they are also theoretically anticipated, but significantly less interesting. Model 5
allows us to account for the potential interactions between Republican control and
rules as well as Republican control and changes in polarization. (Note also that
consumer sentiment is positive and significant, indicating that Republicans respond
broadly positive to increasingly positive economic conditions.)
Figure 4.4 can be a lot to take in at first glance. Note that changes in the
number of rules run along the x-axis, from forty fewer rules than the year before (the
minimum value) to forty more rules than the year before. Three lines are presented:
the dashed line at year-over-year increases in polarization (by 0.1 units), the solid
line at no change in polarization, and the dotted line at year-over-year decreases in
polarization. The y-axis is the marginal effect of switching from Democratic control
to Republican control. Positive values, then, indicate that a certain context (in the
sense of the x-axis and the line type) results in a positive return on Republican
control.
One line is especially easy to interpret. When year-over-year polarization is stable
(that is, no change [the solid line]), switches from Democratic to Republican control
of the House has no effect, regardless of the change in the number of rules used.
Republican identifiers account for the distance between the parties when forming
their opinion of the institution. If that distance is constant, party control of the
institution is irrelevant to approval.
One other context is simple to interpret as well. When the number of rules used
from year-to-year declines significantly, control of the institution does not matter.
Theoretically, Republicans seem not to care who controls the House, if the party in
control is not using rules to accomplish partisan goals. If the normal Congressional
lawmaking process (the “textbook” Congress) is taking hold, and rule usage is stable,
Republicans do not increase or decrease their approval of the institution.
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As rule usage increases year-over-year, though, we see the anticipated diverging
lines. As the usage of rules increases, and polarization is increasing as well (the
dashed line), Republican control of the institution begins to yield positive, significant
returns on increases in Republican approval. These effects are large, too. Even for a
moderate increase in the usage of rules (ten more rules than the previous year) and
an increase in polarization of 0.1 units, Republican control of the House increases
Republican approval of the institution by over 50 points. Approval only ranges
between 0 - 100, so this effect is substantively huge. Partisan control of the institution
has large effects in polarizing, partisan conditions. This effect is exactly the opposite
in depolarizing conditions (the dotted line). Republican control decreases Republican
approval if rules are being used in a depolarized context (presumably to pursue
less partisan policy goals). On the whole, then, the interactive specification for
Republicans provides strong support for the theory, given the limited number of
degrees of freedom.
Table 4.4 presents the results for Democratic identifiers. The results have two
broad patterns. First, they generally follow the theoretical predictions (discussed in
a moment). Second, they are a mirror image of the effects for Republicans (which
we should expect). Thus, when Republicans approve of increases in some concept
under Republican control, Democrats disapprove (and vice versa).
Similar to Republicans, the straightforward Model 1 is statistically uninteresting.
Recall, however, that this reflects the nuances of the theory over conventional wisdom,
not the unimportance of the theoretical variables considered here. The only variable
to exert a statistically significant effect is changes in consumer sentiment. These
changes are in the anticipated positive direction. In fact, consumer sentiment exerts
a positive effect in each of the models. This is only true for Democrats, giving
some evidence that, for Democratic identifiers in particular, economic considerations
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Table 4.4: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (Democrats)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
∆Yt−1 0.097 0.096 0.122 0.022 -0.066
(0.204) (0.209) (0.207) (0.206) (0.205)
Policy Divergence 4.524 4.498 3.200 7.415 7.848
(6.776) (6.911) (6.968) (6.892) (6.808)
∆Rules (All) -0.041 -0.045 0.006 -0.086 -0.029
(0.080) (0.095) (0.096) (0.084) (0.103)
∆Consumer Sentiment 0.370∗ 0.373∗ 0.447∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.502∗∗
(0.187) (-0.193) (0.207) (0.186) (0.199)
Republican Control -2.105 -2.129 -1.775 -3.041 -1.369
(3.049) (3.118) (3.084) (3.043) (3.041)
∆House Polarization -26.307 -26.737 -24.430 -40.388 -42.078
(33.508) (34.503) (33.716) (34.043) (32.344)
Republican Control∗ - 0.016 - - -0.182
∆Rules (All) (0.188) (0.218)
∆House Polarization∗ - - -2.524 - -1.993
∆Rules (All) (2.866) (2.976)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - 197.528 505.547∗∗
Republican Control (130.814) (186.149)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - - -10.992
Republican Control∗ (6.746)
∆Rules (All)
Constant -0.536 -0.522 0.078 -1.243 -1.305
(2.789) (2.846) (2.886) (2.765) (2.728)
R2 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.38
N 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 7.268 7.327 7.298 7.243 7.370
BIC 137.904 141.420 140.431 138.572 152.050
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
matter for Congressional approval.
Interestingly, our inferences do not change in Models 2 - 4. Each of the pairwise
interactions between our theoretical variables of interest contributes nothing sta-
tistically significant to the explanation of Democratic approval. Accordingly, I only
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substantively interpret the theoretical Model 5, which contains the triple interaction.
Again, in Model 5, changes in consumer sentiment exert a positive significant
effect on changes in Democratic approval. Several of the unconditional effects are in
the anticipated direction (Republican control is negative, changes in rules is negative,
changes in polarization is negative), but all are insignificant. The triple interaction
itself narrowly misses statistical significance, with p = 0.12. The interactions jointly
are significant at the 0.10 level (F = 2.09, p = 0.091), and this interaction is in
the anticipated negative direction. Again, I choose to substantively interpret the
interaction for the same reasons outlined above (appreciating data limitations, theo-
retical interest in the combined interactive effects of the theoretical variables). The
interactive effects from Model 5 are outlined in Figure 4.5.
Again, Figure 4.5 seems complicated.11 To illustrate the theoretical flexibility of
the interactive effects estimated, I change the x-axis to Democratic control versus
Republican control. There are again three lines presented: the dashed line at year-
over-year increases in polarization (by 0.2 units), the solid line at no change in
polarization, and the dotted line at year-over-year decreases in polarization. The
y-axis is the marginal effect of year-over-year increases in the number of rules used.
Positive values, then, indicate that a certain context (in the sense of the x-axis and
the line type) results in a positive return on using more rules.
Similar to Figure 4.4, when year-over-year polarization is stable (that is, no
change [the solid line]), increases in the number of rules used from the previous
year have no effect, regardless of which party controls the House (on the x-axis).
Similar to Republicans, Democratic identifiers also account for changes in polariza-
tion when approving of the institution. If polarization is not changing, party control
11Some readers might wonder whether the triple interaction is being interpreted advantageously
in the preceding figures. Accordingly, I present the same marginal effect structure in Figure 4.5
(for Democrats) in Figure 4.6 (for Republicans).
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Figure 4.5: Marginal Effect of Changes in Rules across Party Control at Different
Changes in Polarization (Democratic Respondents).
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Figure 4.6: Marginal Effect of Changes in Rules across Party Control at Different
Changes in Polarization (Republican Respondents).
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of the institution is irrelevant for approval.
Perhaps the most surprising finding in Figure 4.5 is the left condition of the Fig-
ure, when Republican control is zero. When Democrats control the House, changes
in Democratic approval are immune to both changes in House polarization as well
as changes in the number of rules. In this condition, then, the only relevant effects
are traditional ones like changes in consumer sentiment.
These effects only differentiate themselves when Republicans control the House.
If Republicans control the House and year-over-year polarization is increasing (the
dashed line), changes in the number of rules used decrease Democratic approval.
This effect makes sense, as those rules, in an increasingly polarized environment, are
assumedly being used to pursue Republican substantive policy goals. This effect is
substantively significant, too—a one-unit year-over-year increase in the number of
rules used, given an increase in polarization of about 0.2 units, leads to a three-unit
decrease in Democratic approval of Congress. The effect is the mirror image for
decreasing polarization, suggesting that Democrats do not mind if Republicans use
increasing numbers of rules, as long as they are used to pursue centrist policy.
One additional pattern is worth mentioning: by any conventional measure, our
explanatory power is much stronger for Republican identifiers than for Democrats. I
suggest two reasons. The first is Republicans have more experience controlling polar-
ized Houses, rather than unpolarized ones. The theory anticipates that co-partisans
should demand and reward partisan outputs as polarization increases. Republicans
spent almost fifty years in the Congressional shadow, accustomed to Democratic rule.
When they finally did win control in 1994, as polarization had already begun at both
the mass and elite level, mass Republicans clamored for partisan policy. Those de-
mand were rewarded, both with particularly restrictive rules and policy outputs (as
described in Section 2). The second reason is that Republicans are more homogenous
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Table 4.5: Predicting Changes in Congressional Approval (Independents)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
∆Yt−1 -0.029 -0.020 -0.027 -0.182 -0.260
(0.186) (0.183) (0.189) (0.156) (0.162)
Policy Divergence 1.840 1.480 1.677 5.814 6.093
(5.744) (5.676) (5.925) (4.790) (4.866)
∆Rules (All) -0.083 -0.134∗ -0.075 -0.167∗∗ -0.115
(0.070) (0.079) (0.084) (0.061) (0.075)
∆Consumer Sentiment 0.293∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.306∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.471∗∗
(0.156) (0.158) (0.175) (0.130) (0.145)
Republican Control 1.054 0.709 1.105 -0.275 0.628
(2.662) (2.641) (2.726) (2.195) (2.281)
∆House Polarization 10.906 5.007 11.288 -16.855 -18.945
(28.637) (28.625) (29.250) (24.415) (24.072)
Republican Control∗ - 0.205 - - -0.167
∆Rules (All) (0.156) (0.166)
∆House Polarization∗ - - -0.424 - -1.961
∆Rules (All) (2.464) (2.171)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - 358.910∗∗ 547.040∗∗
Republican Control (93.546) (141.080)
∆House Polarization∗ - - - - -4.739
Republican Control∗ (4.900)
∆Rules (All)
Constant -1.450 -1.204 -1.367 -2.416 -2.430
(2.403) (2.380) (2.494) (1.973) (2.001)
R2 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.46 0.54
N 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 6.970 6.965 7.027 6.580 6.778
BIC 127.752 129.112 131.239 116.024 131.941
∗∗p < 0.05. ∗p < 0.10.
Portmanteau Q tests insignificant.
than Democrats, and, when speaking about polarization, the first movers between
the two parties (Wood and Jordan 2011; elite Republicans as well [Theriault 2013]).
It makes sense, then, that they are universally more responsive to partisan policy.
The final set of models is presented in Table 4.5. These models predict changes in
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approval among Independent identifiers. Recall the anticipated effects: Independents
should be broadly immune to particular partisan effects and should instead follow
conventional models (positive effects of the economy, negative effects of contentious
policymaking) when approving of the institution. In general, the effects we observe
should mirror those found for full approve in Table 4.2.
This is exactly what we observe. In fact, the coefficient estimates and patterns of
interactive effects are almost identical for Independents in Table 4.5 as they are for
the full series in Table 4.2. Changes in consumer sentiment are consistently positive
in their effect on changes in Independent approval. Again, the preferred model is
Model 4. Changes in rules have an unconditionally negative effect on changes in
Independent approval. The estimated interaction between Republican control and
changes in polarization is positive and significant. That interaction is interpreted in
both directions in Figures 4.7 and 4.8.
What is especially intriguing about Figures 4.7 and 4.8 is that they are almost
identical to Figures 4.2 and 4.3, which interpret the same interaction term for full
respondents. The inferences are almost identical: Independents reward Republicans
when year-over-year polarization increases (but not Democrats, seen in the x-axis of
Figure 4.7), but punish Congressional approval when Republicans control depolar-
izing Houses (and reward Democrats, seen in the x-axis of Figure 4.8). This pairs
nicely with our theoretical prediction—certain dynamics, such as partisan tools like
changes in rules—should especially effect only approval among partisan identifiers.
Others, like economic circumstances, should be immune to partisan control. And
Independents should mirror the dynamics of the full set of respondents.
It should be noted that the other control variable—policy divergence—never ex-
erts a statistically significant effect. This is probably due somewhat to the empirical
limitations of the data. More theoretically, however, it seems that, especially when
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we account for the partisanship of the respondent, policy outputs simply take a back
seat to partisan dynamics of lawmaking and polarization in the institution.
One final comment is in order. Far and away, our best explanations of partisan
approval arise for Republican respondents. Compare, for instance, the relative model
fit statistics in each of the full theoretical models (Model 5) in Tables 4.2 to 4.5.
It seems generally that Republicans understand changes in polarization and hold
Congress to a more partisan standard as polarization increases. This pairs nicely
with mass polarization evidence, indicating that Republicans are largely responsible
(as the first movers) for increases in mass polarization (Wood and Jordan 2011).
4.6 Conclusion
Research on Congressional approval has been stagnated by attempting to answer
some of the same questions. We wonder why individuals approve of their member
differently than the institution (Parker and Davidson 1979), why individuals expect
a non-partisan policymaking process (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), or if individ-
uals punish Congress when policy is made in a contentious way (Ramirez 2009) or
out-of-step with aggregate preferences (Ramirez 2013).
What these questions miss is the growing importance of partisan identification
in determining an individual’s preferred outputs in Congressional policy. As polar-
ization grows, both at the mass and elite level, partisanship begins to provide an
increasingly important answer to these questions. Moreover, it suggests opposite an-
swers for Republicans versus Democrats. Republicans should increasingly approve of
Republican Congresses when they use more rules to achieve Republican policy, and
vice versa for Democrats. There is no single, aggregate dynamic of approval for all
respondents.
This is exactly what we observe. The theory is well supported, though not quite
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statistically significantly, in its predictions regarding partisan approval. Not only
are the dynamics for each partisan identification different, they reflect growing parti-
san preferences as polarization grows. These findings help to resolve multiple points
of confusion in the literature, such as the inconsistent findings of the effect of party
identification on approval and the seemingly impossible low level of Congressional ap-
proval among mass identifiers. As polarization grows, political science must account
for the appreciable differences between Republicans, Democrats, and Independents,
both in their policy demands and the dynamics of how institutional outputs affect
approval.
The analysis here is largely straightforward for partisans. For Independents,
however, the implications are less clear. Some traditional dynamics retain their
substantive importance, such as the effect of consumer sentiment. Others, however,
are less clear. Independent policy divergence does not seem to play a strong role in
determining how Independents approve of Congress. The usage of rules, however,
clearly depresses Independent approval. Given that increasingly restrictive rules are
becoming the normal way of passing partisan legislation (Section 2), Independents
are at increasing risk of being left dissatisfied with Congress as polarization pushes
partisan ideology and policy to the forefront.
This study is just a general foray into the analysis of Congressional approval
among different partisan identifiers. Yet it has many strengths. First among them is
the attempt to disaggregate the approval of a major American political institution
among partisan identifiers. This disaggregation was fruitful: even a simple graphical
examination demonstrates that different processes exists across the partisan groups.
Examining these differential processes, especially in an era of mass and elite polar-
ization, is an important exercise.
Lastly, it encourages a reconceptualization of the way scholars think about the
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Congressional approval question. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) remark at several
points that respondents answer the approval question thinking of their member, not
of the institution. This analysis questions this conventional wisdom. There are clear,
definable patterns to movements in approval among partisan identifiers, and these
movements often respond to shifts in the partisan composition of institutions. This
suggests that, especially in eras of polarization, respondents evaluate Congress as
an (especially partisan) institution, not just as a group of individual members. This
shifting framework has real consequences: McDermott and Jones (2003) demonstrate
that individuals who evaluate Congress highly are more likely to vote for members
of the majority party, even despite incumbency status. Adjusting our understanding
of Congressional approval to reflect the resurgence of polarization is essential to our
broader understanding of Congress.
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5. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHER WORK
The preceding sections have laid out a fully elaborated theory of lawmaking,
working from the current conceptualization of Conditional Party Government. Con-
ditional Party Government, as it exists currently, offers a limited set of incomplete
predictions. The theory here elaborates those predictions to account for the use of
positive and negative procedural and substantive powers by both the majority and
minority party in the United States House of Representatives. The theory predicts
the unique usage of those different types of powers on the basis of the “condition”
of CPG: the homogeneity of the majority party (especially relative to the minority)
and the distance between the two.
The core of these theoretical expectations is supported. Especially when working
with the most appropriate statistical models (those effects found in levels), Section 2
presented evidence that the use of positive, substantive powers in particular responds
to distance, as predicted by the theory. These powers are the most important ones, as
well, because of their unique importance in shaping legislation before it even reaches
the House floor. As polarization increases, recall, the majority party is increasingly
jettisoning the use of the textbook Congressional process in favor of party-controlled
legislation in committee.The use of positive procedural powers was more difficult
to predict. Although these powers broadly responded to the distance between the
parties, they do not respond in the theoretically anticipated way to minority party
variance.
Moreover, certain types of rules are more important for moving policy than for
others. Section 2 again presents evidence that rules in the nature of a substitute
as adopted—rather than all rules generally—are important for increasing policy ex-
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tremism over time. Recall exactly how important these rules can be: amendments in
the nature of a substitute considered as adopted allows the majority party to write
legislation (often in the Rules Committee, not even in a substantive committee), send
that legislation to the floor without any procedural hurdle, and pass that legislation
as written: all by winning a single vote on a single rule. Previous analyses that
treated all rules symmetrically have missed this important distinction.
The above findings illustrate another contribution of the dissertation. Currently,
rules are measured as a single, aggregate concept. All rules are considered restrictive
rules, and all restrictive rules are important. The theory here reconceptualizes rules
as unique entities to be coded individually. That is, some rules are simply more
important than others. The most restrictive of these rules—those that consider
substitute amendments as adopted—are fundamentally different than other rules
that set the time for debate or declare the source of an amendment. When we
analyze these series separately, we find they respond to different factors theoretically.
Moreover, the theory and methods outlined above provide a general path moving
forward so that the analyst can identify any potentially important pattern in rules,
generate a time series of those rules, and uncover what causes the usage of those
rules over time.
The evidence for the theory is weaker with regards to representation. We ex-
pected to find that representation increases to co-partisans of the majority party
in the House of Representatives as polarization increases and restrictive (positive
substantive powers) are used to create policy. We found a shift in policy extrem-
ism as a result of these rules in Section 2, but no such direct linkage in Section 3.
Although there was general evidence of representation in Section 3, rules did not
enhance representation to the full constituency (consistent with H12), and there was
no evidence that rules (even positive substantive ones) were used to enhance rep-
144
resentation to partisan sub-constituencies. The VAR in levels, however, found that
increases in moods (becoming more liberal or conservative), even co-partisan moods,
were reflected by increases in policy extremism (becoming appropriately more liberal
or conservative). We just did not find evidence that this relationship was conditional
on rule usage.
The evidence for the implications of the theory for Congressional approval was
much stronger. In Section 4, we found that, as polarization increases, partisans tend
to approve of the House more when it uses rules in a conflictual way, evidently under
the assumption that those rules are being used to accomplish polarizing, partisan
goals. This relationship was only true among Republicans and Democrats. Indepen-
dents followed the traditional model of Congressional approval, whereby individuals
approve of Congress more when it makes policy and when the economy is good.
Here again we see strong evidence for the need to recast traditional research
methods in a partisan light. Traditional studies of Congressional approval treat
all partisan groups symmetrically, summarizing approval as a single, aggregate mea-
sure. The evidence presented here suggests it is necessary to examine partisan groups
separately, especially once we account for polarization. Moreover, this disaggrega-
tion helped to resolve a traditional methodological question. Previous studies had
found aggregate Congressional approval to be fractionally integrated. The results
here suggest that fractional integration arose precisely because of summarizing over
heterogenous respondents (individuals of different partisanship). Disaggregating the
series, these issues disappear.
The theory and tests reported in the preceding sections have many merits. Chief
among them, we can use the theory of lawmaking presented here to make a priori
predictions about the precise use of different kinds of powers and the resulting qual-
ity of legislation that should arise as a result of the usage of those powers. Previous
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studies of lawmaking, especially those advancing CPG, had been theoretically stag-
nated by a single, diffuse prediction: that the greater the “condition” of CPG, the
more we see its outcomes. Here, we bypass that theoretical diffuseness by offering
specific predictions for each potentially observable distribution of parties.
In addition, the above empirical results reflect the first systematic, longitudinal
test of the fully formed theory of Conditional Party Government. Overwhelmingly,
CPG had traditionally been “tested” through individual case studies. These studies
provide anecdotal evidence for the use of powers in one specific circumstance, but
little leverage on the empirical question of the variation of the use of rules over time
in response to specific conditions. Here, we can actually quantify the expected use of
individual types of rules in a particular Congress, based on the “condition” of CPG.
In this sense, it is acceptable if not all of the original theoretical propositions offered
here are supported empirically.
The dissertation has also demonstrated that the theory can be used to directly
predict and explain lawmaking, but it readily offers clear predictions for other tra-
ditional Congressional research questions. In other words, the sections readily speak
to each other. The representational benefit to co-partisans tested in Section 3 was
directly implied by Section 2. The unique process of Congressional approval by par-
tisanship tested in Section 4 was borne out of the predictions of Section 2 as well.
The theory does not just explain lawmaking; it helps to explain Congress generally.
This flexibility and innovation is prized, as it helps to offer a theoretically complete
account of Congress.
The theory and evidence presented here, of course, can be improved. Chief among
the concerns is the short time series in Sections 3 and 4. Approval is just not
measured very far in time for Section 4. Moreover, we need more oscillation in
partisan control of Congress, both in polarized time periods and unpolarized ones.
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The measure of policy outputs could also be improved. As is readily identified from
Figure 3.3, the measure of policy liberalism from Ramirez (2013) is very choppy. That
choppiness could be inhibiting our ability to explain movements in policy with co-
partisan moods. Also in Section 3, the measures of partisan moods could be updated.
Ura and Ellis (2012) provide a nice starting point, but future research could update
these series to bring more data to bear on the question of representation. The desire
for a longer time series typically is a “common” complaint, meaning that all analysts
prefer more data to less data. When the analyst needs to estimate a VAR with only
35 data points, the issue becomes more acute.
Other estimation strategies could be used. There are a few points where models
are reported that, although they illuminate “first cuts” at the empirical relationships
among the variables, they do a relatively poor job of accounting for some of the finer
time-serial qualities of the estimation at hand. In particular, Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions could be used to help account for the potentially correlated errors in the
partisan approval equations in Section 4. Additionally, state-space models could help
replace some of the partial adjustment models reported in Sections 3 and 4. Partial
adjustment models, while they help to estimate the short-run effects of the variables,
do not allow the analyst to examine long-run effects. The estimation strategies are
opportunities for future work.
I close with the following observations. Lawmaking in Congress is an extraordi-
narily important field of research to political scientists concerned with the quality of
democracy. It impacts how laws are made, what laws are made, how representative
those laws are, and the openness of the entire process. For as important as lawmak-
ing is, it is still undertheorized. We have broad expectations about what kinds of
lawmaking should arise, but those expectations are diffuse and ill-prepared to offer
specific predictions. Moreover, our tests of those expectations remain isolated in
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time. The theory presented here, with all of its imperfections, offers a major step
forward in that process. We have, for the first time, fully formed theoretical ex-
pectations of lawmaking for all possible permutations (stylized) of parties, a flexible
measurement strategy of rules required to test those expectations, and longitudinal,
time series, quantified models of those expectations in the real world. Not all of our
theoretical expectations are supported. But before we can understand why we are
wrong, we have to make predictions and uncover where and when we are wrong. The
theory and tests here offer that first step.
148
REFERENCES
Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. The Disappearing Center. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. “Ideological Realignment in the
U.S. Electorate.” The Journal of Politics 60 (3): 634–652.
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. “Is Polarization a Myth?” The
Journal of Politics 70 (2): 542–555.
Adams, James, Benjamin G. Bishin, and Jay K. Dow. 2004. “Representation in
Congressional Campaigns: Evidence for Discounting/Directional Voting in U.S.
Senate Elections.” The Journal of Politics 66 (2): 348–373.
Adler, E. Scott, and John D. Wilkerson. 2013. Congress and the Politics of Problem
Solving. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Aldrich, John H. 2011. Why Parties? A Second Look. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1998. “Measuring Conditional Party Govern-
ment.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago,
IL.
Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2000. “The Consequences of Party Organi-
zation in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional
Party Government.” In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Parti-
san Era, ed. Jon R. Bond, and Richard Fleisher. Washington D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press pp. 31–72.
Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2001. “The Logic of Conditional Party
149
Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection.” In Congress Reconsidered, ed.
Lawrence C. Dodd, and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Seventh ed. Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press.
Aldrich, John H., David W. Rohde, and Michael W. Tofias. 2004. “Examining
Congress with a Two-Dimensional Political Space.” Presented at the American
Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL.
Aldrich, John H., David W. Rohde, and Michael W. Tofias. 2007. “One D is Not
Enough: Measuring ‘CPG,’ 1887-2002.” In Party, Policy, and Political Change in
Congress, Volume 2, ed. David W. Brady, and Matthew D. McCubbins. Stanford:
Stanford University Press pp. 102–112.
Aldrich, John H., and James S. Coleman Battista. 2002. “Conditional Party Gov-
ernment in the States.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 164–172.
Anderson, Sarah, and Philip Habel. 2009. “Revisiting Adjusted ADA Scores for the
US Congress, 1947-2007.” Political Analysis 17 (1): 83–88.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001a. “Can-
didate Positioning in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science
45 (1): 136–159.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001b. “The
Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 26 (4): 533–572.
APSA. 1950. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.” American Political
Science Review 44 (3): 174–186.
Bach, Stanley, and Steven S. Smith. 1988. Managing Uncertainty in the House of
Representatives. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Barber, James D. 1972. The Presidential Character. First ed. New York: Prentice-
Hall.
150
Binder, Sarah A. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the De-
velopment of Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Born, Richard. 1990. “The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members
May Run from Congress, but They Can’t Hide.” The Journal of Politics 52 (4):
1223–1241.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Andrew R. Tomlinson. 2000. “Fractional Integration
Methods in Political Science.” Electoral Studies 19: 63–76.
Brady, David W., Joseph Cooper, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1979. “The Decline of
Party in the US House of Representatives, 1887-1968.” Legislative Studies Quar-
terly 4 (3): 381–407.
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding
Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14 (1): 63–
83.
Caldeira, Gregory A., and James L. Gibson. 1992. “The Etiology of Public Support
for the Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political Science 36 (3): 635–664.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. “Out of Step,
out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting.” The Ameri-
can Political Science Review 96 (1): 127–140.
Carsey, Thomas M., and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. “Changing Sides or Changing
Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate.”
American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 464–477.
Chanley, Virginia A., Thomas J. Rudolph, and Wendy M. Rahn. 2000. “The Origins
and Consequences of Public Trust in Government.” Public Opinion Quarterly 64:
239–256.
Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2009. “A Unified Theory of US Law-
making: Preferences, Institutions, and Party Discipline.” The Journal of Politics
151
71 (4): 1257–1272.
Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls
in the 106th House.” The Journal of Politics 68 (2): 397–409.
Clinton, Joshua D., Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The Statistical
Analysis of Roll Call Data.” The American Political Science Review 98 (2): 355–
370.
Clucas, Richard A. 2009. “The Contract with America and Conditional Party Gov-
ernment in State Legislatures.” Political Research Quarterly 62 (2): 317–328.
Cooper, Joseph, and David W. Brady. 1981. “Institutional Context and Leadership
Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn.” The American Political Science
Review 75 (2): 411–425.
Cooper, Joseph, David William Brady, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1977. “The Electoral
Basis of Party Voting: Patterns and Trends in the U.S. House of Representatives,
1887-1969.” In The Impact of the Electoral Process, ed. Louis Maisel, and Joseph
Cooper. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage pp. 133–165.
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible
Party Government in the US House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
De Boef, Suzanna, and Luke Keele. 2008. “Taking Time Seriously.” American Journal
of Political Science 52 (1): 184–200.
Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About
Politics and Why it Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Duff, Jeremy F., and David W. Rohde. 2012. “Rules to Live By: Agenda Control
and the Partisan Use of Special Rules in the House.” Congress & the Presidency
39 (1): 28–50.
Durr, Robert H. 1993. “What Moves Policy Sentiment?” The American Political
152
Science Review 87 (1): 158–170.
Durr, Robert H., John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. “Explaining
Congressional Approval.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 175–207.
Edwards III, George C., William Mitchell, and Reed Welch. 1995. “Explaining Pres-
idential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience.” American Journal of Polit-
ical Science 39 (1): 108–134.
Enders, Walter. 2010. Applied Econometric Time Series. Third ed. Hoboken: Wiley.
Enns, Peter K., and Paul M. Kellstedt. 2008. “Policy Mood and Political Sophisti-
cation: Why Everybody Moves Mood.” British Journal of Political Science 38 (3):
433–454.
Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. The Macro
Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feinerer, Ingo, Kurt Hornik, and David Meyer. 2008. “Text Mining Infrastructure
in R.” Journal of Statistical Software 25 (5): 1–54.
Ferejohn, John A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-
1968. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Finocchiaro, Charles J., and David W. Rohde. 2008. “War for the Floor: Partisan
Theory and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly XXXIII (1): 35–61.
Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2011. Culture War?
The Myth of a Polarized America. Boston: Longman.
Fleisher, Richard, and John R. Bond. 2004. “The Shrinking Middle in the US
Congress.” British Journal of Political Science 34 (3): 429–451.
Gibson, James L. 1989. “Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Pro-
cedural Justice, and Political Tolerance.” Law & Society Review 23 (3): 469–496.
Gibson, James L., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 2009. Citizens, Courts, and Confirma-
153
tions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence. 2003. “Mea-
suring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court.” American Journal of
Political Science 47 (2): 354–367.
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. 1998. “On the Legit-
imacy of National High Courts.” The American Political Science Review 92 (2):
343–358.
Granger, Clyde W. J. 1980. “Long Memory Relationships and the Aggregation of
Dynamic Models.” Journal of Econometrics 14: 227–238.
Grant, J. Tobin, and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2004. “The Job of Representation in
Congress: Public Expectations and Representative Approval.” Legislative Studies
Quarterly 29 (3): 431–445.
Green, Matthew N. 2015. Underdog Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Griffin, John D. 2006. “Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A
Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis.” The Journal of Politics 68 (4): 911–921.
Griffin, John D., and Brian Newman. 2005. “Are Voters Better Represented?” The
Journal of Politics 67 (4): 1206–1227.
Groseclose, Tim, Steven D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder Jr. 1999. “Comparing
Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the
U.S. Congress.” The American Political Science Review 93 (1): 33–50.
Hetherington, Marc J., and Johnathan D. Weiler. 2010. Authoritarianism and Po-
larization in American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hibbing, John R., and Elizatbeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Kim Quaile. N.d. “Unraveling the ‘Standard Model’ of Dyadic Representation
in Search of a General Theory of Legislative Behavior.” Texas A&M University.
154
Manuscript.
Hill, Kim Quaile, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. “Dyadic Representation Reap-
praised.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1): 109–137.
Hill, Kim Quaile, and Soren Jordan. N.d. “Evaluating the Quality of Proxy Measures
of Concepts: With a Validity and Reliability Assessment for the Proxy Measure-
ment of Constituency Ideology.” Texas A&M University. Manuscript.
Holton, Gerald. 1952. Introduction to Concepts and Theories in Physical Science.
Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.
House of Representatives, Committee on Rules. (2011). Providing for the Considera-
tion of H.R. 3463, H.R. 527, and H.R. 3010 (House Report 112-296): Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
House of Representatives, Committee on Rules. 2012. Survey of Activities of the
House Committee on Rules for the 112th Congress (House Report 112-751): Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Hurley, Patricia A., and Kim Quaile Hill. 2003. “Beyond the Demand-Input Model:
A Theory of Representational Linkages.” The Journal of Politics 65 (2): 304–326.
Jones, David R., and Monika L. McDermott. 2002. “Ideological Distance from the
Majority Party and Public Approval of Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
27 (2): 245–264.
Kimball, David C., and Samuel C. Patterson. 1997. “Living Up to Expectations:
Public Attitudes Toward Congress.” The Journal of Politics 59 (3): 701–728.
Kinder, Donald R. 1981. “Presidents, Prosperity, and Public Opinion.” The Public
Opinion Quarterly 45 (1): 1–21.
Koger, Gregory. 2010. Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House
and Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: Uni-
155
versity of Michigan Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1997. “Restrictive Rules Reconsidered.” American Journal of Po-
litical Science 41 (3): 919–944.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz. 2009. “Partisan Dynamics and the Volatility
of Presidential Approval.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (3): 609–631.
Krosnick, Jon A., and Donald R. Kinder. 1990. “Altering the Foundations of Support
for the President Through Priming.” The American Political Science Review 84
(2): 497–512.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Kuklinski, James H. 1977. “District Competitiveness and Legislative Roll-Call Be-
havior: A Reassessment of the Marginality Hypothesis.” American Journal of
Political Science 21 (3): 627–638.
Lebo, Matthew J. 2008. “Divided Government, United Approval: The Dynamics
of Congressional and Presidential Approval.” Congress & the Presidency 35 (2):
1–16.
Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. 2007. “Strategic Party
Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000.” American Journal of Po-
litical Science 51 (3): 464–481.
Leogrande, William M., and Alana S. Jeydel. 1997. “Using Presidential Election
Returns to Measure Constituency Ideology.” American Politics Quarterly 25 (1):
3–18.
Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats
and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
156
Linn, Suzanna, Luke Keele, and Clayton McLaughlin Webb. 2015. “Treating Time
With All Due Seriousness.” Presented at the International Methods Colloquium,
Houston, TX.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and William Schneider. 1983. “The Decline of Confidence
in American Institutions.” Political Science Quarterly 98 (3): 379–402.
Lu¨tkepohl, Helmut. 2007. New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis. Berlin:
Springer.
Marshall, Bryan W. 2002. “Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform
House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (1): 61–85.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2008. Polarized America:
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: MIT Press.
McDermott, Monika L., and David R. Jones. 2003. “Do Public Evaluations of
Congress Matter? Retrospective Voting in Congressional Elections.” American
Politics Research 31 (2): 155–177.
Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.”
American Political Science Review 57 (1): 45–56.
Oleszek, Walter J. 2011. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. Eighth
ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Parker, Glenn R. 1977. “Some Themes in Congressional Unpopularity.” American
Journal of Political Science 21 (1): 93–109.
Parker, Glenn R., and Roger H. Davidson. 1979. “Why Do Americans Love Their
Congressmen so Much More than Their Congress?” Legislative Studies Quarterly
4 (1): 53–61.
Patterson, Samuel C., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1990. “Standing up for Congress:
157
Variations in Public Esteem since the 1960s.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (1):
25–47.
Patterson, Samuel C., Randall B. Ripley, and Stephen V. Quinlan. 1992. “Citi-
zens’ Orientations toward Legislatures: Congress and the State Legislature.” The
Western Political Quarterly 45 (2): 315–338.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Ideology & Congress. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers.
Ramirez, Mark D. 2009. “The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional Ap-
proval.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 681–694.
Ramirez, Mark D. 2013. “The Policy Origins of Congressional Approval.” The Jour-
nal of Politics 75 (1): 198–209.
Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rohde, David W. 2010. “Political Institutions and Public Choice House Roll-Call
Database.” Duke University, Durham, NC.
Rohde, David W., and John H. Aldrich. 2010. “Consequences of Electoral and
Institutional Change: The Evolution of Conditional Party Government in the US
House of Representatives.” In New Directions in American Political Parties, ed.
Jeffrey M. Stonecash. New York: Routledge pp. 234–250.
Rudolph, Thomas J. 2002. “The Economic Sources of Congressional Approval.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (4): 577–599.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1994. “House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Contro-
versy.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (4): 477–494.
Smith, Steven S. 2007. Party Influence in Congress. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Smith, Steven S., and Gerald Gamm. 2009. “The Dynamics of Party Government in
158
Congress.” In Congress Reconsidered, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd, and Bruce I. Oppen-
heimer. Ninth ed. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press pp. 141–164.
Stimson, James A. 1999. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings.
Second ed. Boulder: Westview Press.
Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic
Representation.” American Political Science Review 89 (3): 543–565.
Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realign-
ment of Political Parties in the United States. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Taylor, Andrew J. 2003. “Conditional Party Government and Campaign Contribu-
tions: Insights from the Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Industries.” American
Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 293–304.
Theriault, Sean M. 2008. Party Polarization in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Theriault, Sean M. 2013. The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in
Congress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ura, Joseph Daniel, and Christopher R. Ellis. 2012. “Partisan Moods: Polarization
and the Dynamics of Mass Party Preferences.” The Journal of Politics 74 (1):
277–291.
Webb, Eugene J., Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest.
1966. Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences. Chicago:
Rand McNally.
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences
for Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 981–1000.
Wood, B. Dan, and Soren Jordan. 2011. “Electoral Polarization: Definition, Measure-
ment, and Evaluation.” Presented at the American Political Science Association
Meeting, Seattle, WA.
159
